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The U.S. government is responsible for protecting the country’s energy and technology 
infrastructure. Critics argue the United States has failed to prepare, protect and respond to 
incidents involving the national electric grid leaving communities vulnerable to 
prolonged power outages. Protection of investor owned utilities’ critical infrastructure is 
vulnerable to cyber and physical harm from the absence of criminalizing the intrusion of 
private sector computer networks, the lack of cybersecurity threats in emergency 
management, and the absence of cyber-intelligent leadership supports this argument.  The 
purpose of this study was to introduce an electric grid protection theoretical concept, 
while identifying whether cybersecurity law and emergency management, amongst the 
investor-owned utility community, has an optimized relationship for protecting the 
national electric grid from harm. Easton’s political system input/output model, 
Sommestad’s cybersecurity theory, and Mitroff’s crisis management theory provided the 
theoretical foundations for this study. The study utilized a mixed method research design 
that incorporated a Likert collection survey and combined quantitative chi-square and 
qualitative analysis. The key findings identified that cybersecurity law and the use of 
emergency management in the electric grid protection theory were not optimized to 
protect the national electric grid from harm. The recommendations of this study included 
the optimization of the theory elements through educational outreach and amending 
administrative cybersecurity law to improve the protection of the national electric grid 
and positively impacting social change by safeguarding the delivery of reliable electric 
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study  
Introduction  
In this study, I examined the practical elements of a proposed electric grid 
protection theory. The theory is a conceptual lens that will advance the discussion and 
contribute to the public policy body of knowledge that addresses cybersecurity law and 
emergency management. This study acts as an orientation to the real problems facing the 
United States’ ability to protect the electric network of the critical infrastructure sector 
from cyber and physical harm. In this study, I focused on the electric industry and two 
pillars of the proposed theory, being acutely aware that additional research in this area 
will need to be conducted to have a complete understanding of the proposed theory. 
In this study, I was concerned with understanding how cybersecurity law and 
emergency management influence protection of the national electrical grid. I attempted to 
understand the gaps in cybersecurity law, particularly in criminal law; how the principles 
of emergency management are used to respond and recover from events that threaten the 
national electrical grid; and how both cybersecurity law and emergency management 
relate providing national electrical grid protective strategy. 
Problem Statement 
Substantial problems are facing the United States’ ability to protect investor-
owned utilities’ electrical grid critical infrastructure from cyber and physical harm. The 
absence of criminalizing private sector computer system intrusions, the exclusion of 
cyber-security threats amid the risks listed in emergency management, and a lack of 




protecting the United States’ investor-owned utilities (Demchak, 2010; Friedman, 2013; 
Koppel, 2015; Mody, 2001; Walker et al., 2010). It was reported that 132 investor-owned 
utilities are responsible for providing energy to 220 million Americans across the national 
electrical grid throughout the United States (Edison Electric Institute, 2016). Electrical 
grid access has increased since the enactment of the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission’s Energy Policy Act following the Enron event in 2002 and the Computer 
Fraud and Abuse Act (Tomain, 2002). The Energy Policy Act set out to increase fair 
market competition at the transmission level through decentralization of energy 
management, while the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act protected government and 
financial sector computer systems from unauthorized access leaving all other private 
sector systems vulnerable (Kerr, 2003).   
The shift to decentralized energy management coupled with today’s Internet 
network dependency has increased the vulnerability of the electric grid to cyber and 
physical attack (Brenner, 2013; Kinney, 2005; Mody, 2001; Watts, 2003). These 
problems may have contributed to the adverse impacts that affected the U.S. government 
and energy systems abroad; for example, adversaries intruded into the U.S. Department 
of Energy exfiltrating 104,000 sensitive data records in 2011, 2012, and 2013 and toppled 
the Ukrainian electric grid in December 2015 causing disruption to 225,000 customers 
for over 6 hours (Foxbrewster, 2016; Freidman, 2013; Ukrainian Journal, 2016). 
National electric grid vulnerability influenced by the identified problems is 
becoming increasingly significant in public policy. Researchers, such as Demchak, 




become an important issue in recent years with an unresolved solution. These researchers 
suggested further investigation into cyber governance issues, cyber understanding 
amongst industry leadership, and emergency management assistance in identifying 
national electric grid protection solutions. 
Easton (1957) proposed a political system theory explaining political governance. 
I used Easton’s political system input/out model to express current gaps and possible 
solutions as a narrative theory and method. Easton’s model is shown in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Easton’s political system theory input/output model (Pooja, 2016). 
Purpose 
The goal of this study was to understand the relationship between cybersecurity 
law and emergency management and the protection of the national electrical grid. I used 
chi-squared analysis to understand the relationship between cybersecurity law, 
emergency management, and the national electrical grid.  
In this study, I introduced a theoretical framework for national electrical grid 




management principles being optimized at the national public policy level to be realized 
as a national electrical grid protection strategy. Cybersecurity law and identified gaps in 
criminalized computer network intrusions by hackers exposes vulnerabilities that provide 
access to the national electrical grid critical infrastructure. Emergency management has 
neglected the integration of its principles into cybersecurity event response and recovery 
delaying emergency response and recovery efforts to compromised computer network 
systems owned by investor-owned utilities. Addressing the proposed problems may 
provide support of the study’s proposed electric grid protection theory. Federal 
government leaders and researchers, such as Brenner (2013), Demchak (2010), Friedman 
(2013), Mody (2001), and Walker (2010), discussed the elements of the study as 
independent influencers over electric grid protection, but they have not considered the 
collective impacts of a single cohesive theory to support national electrical grid 
protection. 
Theoretical Frameworks 
The frameworks I used for this study were derived from Crotty’s mixed method 
research conceptualization as presented in Figure 2 (see Creswell, 2011). The 
epistemological assumption of the framework comes from the blending of the 
postpositivism and constructivism paradigms. Postpositivism guided the empirical 
observations in the study, where constructivism guided my proposed electric protection 
theory through the view of the national electric grid protection phenomenon. Easton 
(1957), Mitroff (1988), and Sommestad (2012) offered theoretical lenses that 




theoretical system model that I used to form an understanding of input problems within 
emergency management and cybersecurity law and their relation to national electric grid 
protection. Mitroff’s and Sommestad’s academic theories on crisis management and 
cybersecurity assisted me in developing a broader understanding of emergency 
management, cybersecurity law, and their gaps as they relate to the protection of the 
national electric grid in this study. 
 
Figure 2. Crotty’s mixed methodology theoretical framework.  
Operational Definitions 
Bulk electric system (BES): Electric generation, transmission lines, 
interconnections, and associated electrical components necessary to transport high 
voltage power.  
Critical infrastructure (CI): Essential services that support the commerce of the 




Crisis management (CM): The process strategy that an organization uses to 
manage a sudden emergency event. 
Cybersecurity: The process by which organizations attempt to secure their 
Internet and Ethernet computer systems from sophisticated adversaries that wish to 
exploit the organization’s information or system (Department of Homeland Security, 
2015).  
Cybersecurity law: The legal governance that provides procedures for those 
victimized by computer intrusions can use to take legal action in response to the 
intrusion.  
Cyberspace: Digital virtual space where data are exchanged between a sender and 
receiver freely.  
Emergency management (EM): The process by which an organization prepares for 
the management of a sudden emergency event by implementing mitigation, preparedness, 
response, and recovery lifecycle actions.  
Energy management system (EMS): The digital infrastructure system that 
manages the generation and transportation of electricity through the BES.  
Hacker:  A person, organization, or nation state that uses computer skills to 
exploit vulnerabilities of computer systems and networks to access to sensitive data, 
system controls, finances, or other devices.  
Industrial control systems (ICS): The general term used to describe computerized 




Incident command system (ICS): A standardized management approach to 
command, control, and coordinate emergency response and recovery actions during a 
catastrophe.  
Investor-owned utility (IOU): A privately-owned energy provider.  
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC): The federal government 
regulatory organization that governs the generation, distribution, market exchange, and 
security of the BES.  
National electric grid: A series of interconnected networks that deliver electricity 
from energy providers to consumers across the BES. Its interconnected network consists 
of generating stations, substations, electrical transmission lines, and electrical distribution 
lines that deliver energy to individual users.  
National Energy Regulatory Corporation (NERC): A federally-sponsored private 
corporation that conducts research, development, and voluntary regulatory programs for 
generators and distributors of electricity.  
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA): A type of industrial control 
system that uses a human machine interface to manage the physical engineering process 
of an industrialized manufacturing system. 
Study Assumptions and Limitations 
In this study, I assumed the research variables independently supported protection 
of the national electrical grid. The results of this study could have revealed the research 




The examination of leadership intelligence was not included in this inquiry. A 
research study examining leadership knowledge and its relationship to national electric 
grid protection may be considered in the future. Finally, I did not reflect inclusively all 
government, public, or private research projects that are investigating additional legal, 
regulatory, and cyber intelligence use cases to improve the security of the U.S. electric 
systems in this study. 
Significance 
The results of this study closed accumulated gaps in the cybersecurity law and 
national electrical grid security literature with guidance on developing a multivariable 
conceptual model that may assist the energy industry in securing the national electric grid 
from cyber and physical harm. As I pointed out in the Problem Statement section of this 
chapter, the factors presented exist as elements of a conceptual national electric grid 
protection model that previous studies had not considered as a cohesive framework. If 
this inquiry is found to support elements of the proposed theoretical model, the research 
contribution could provide criminal protection against computing system attacks and 
improve management of events that cause cyber and physical harm to the national 
electric grid.  
National electrical grid protection and providing reliable energy are public policy 
matters. Electrical power supports individuals, families, economy, health care, 
transportation, government, and commerce. The inability to protect the national electric 




Executing this research study to examine these elements created an opportunity for me to 
improve overall electric EM. 
Research Questions 
Protecting the national electric grid is a complex problem. I developed the 
research questions in this inquiry to be rooted in both the postpositivism and 
constructivism worldviews. In this study, I used Creswell’s mixed method approach to 
blend these worldviews and distinguish justified belief from opinion. The research 
questions addressed both the quantitative “top down” and qualitative “bottom up” inquiry 
approach to determine solutions to protecting the national electric grid (see Creswell, 
2008). The research questions were constructed from both worldviews to quantitatively 
support or reject the research hypotheses and qualitatively explain the observable 
phenomena.  
Easton’s (1957) political system input/output model mechanizes the demands 
(inputs) of a problem to derive solutions, processes, or consequential outputs. With the 
electric grid protection theory, I considered the demands (cybersecurity law, EM, and 
national electrical grid) supported by the theoretical stances of cybersecurity and CM. 
Therefore, the following inputs of the research questions and outputs of the hypotheses 
were constructed to guide this study:  
RQ1: To what extent is there a relationship between EM and the protection of the 
national electrical grid?  
H01: EM principles focus on physical events and not cybersecurity events, 




RQ2: To what extent is there a relationship between cybersecurity law and the 
protection of the national electrical grid?  
H02: Cybersecurity law does not provide a legal means to protect the 
national electrical grid.  
RQ3: Does cybersecurity law and EM support a framework to protect the national 
electrical grid?  
H03: Cybersecurity law and EM currently does not provide a framework to 
protect the national electrical grid. 
Summary 
This chapter contained the introduction and background of the study that 
introduced the electric grid protection theory and its elements. The electric grid 
protection theory elements were introduced as cybersecurity law, emergency 
management, and the national electric grid. The study’s research introduced the concept 
that if the study elements have an optimized relationship they may align to provide a 
protective framework for the national electric grid. Following the introduction, the 
study’s theoretical frameworks were described, and technical operating nomenclature 
defined. Easton (1957), Mitroff (1988), and Sommestad (2012) offered the theoretical 
underpinnings for the construction of this study.  An overview was provided of the mixed 





Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Introduction 
Protection of investor owned utilities’ critical infrastructure is vulnerable to cyber 
and physical harm from the absence of criminalizing the intrusion of private sector 
computer networks, the lack of integration of cyber threats into emergency management, 
and the absence of cyber knowledge at proper management levels. The goal of the study 
was to understand the relationship between cybersecurity law, emergency management, 
and the national electric grid to determine if the relationship supports a framework to 
protect the national electric grid.  The literature review provides the context for this 
study. The chapter contains eleven sections that define the specific themes and elements 
contributing to the current state of cybersecurity law, emergency management, the 
national electric grid, and the electric grid protection theory.  
The first section defines the bulk electric system, the second section introduces 
the electric utility industrial control system call the supervisory control and data 
accusation system, and the third section explains the decentralization of the transmission 
market. The fourth and fifth sections review public policy relating to the electric grid and 
cyber governance. The sixth and seventh sections focus on cyber intelligence and attacks 
on electrical utility systems.  The remaining sections describe the principles of 







Literature Search Strategy 
Bulk Electric System (BES) 
The modern bulk electrical grid is an energy transportation system built by private 
utility providers over a century ago (Kinney, 2005). The electric grid is made up of a 
series of industrial control systems that power generation facilities, transformers, 
substations, and transmission lines that distribute electrical energy to end users. The 
power grid is revered as a critical infrastructure that assures reliability with minimal 
possibility of failure in the United States (Bompard, 2009; Friedman, 2013; Kinney, 
2005; Ten, 2010). The electric grid system depends on industrial control systems that 
regulate electricity load, the balance of load voltages, and balance of frequency to ensure 
the bulk electrical network is not overloaded or underloaded before the system fails 
(Bompard, 2009, p. 6; Ginter, 2016).   
Independent utility providers developed a series of interconnections to stabilize 
load balance and share excess generated electricity to improve energy reliability 
(Bompard, 2009; Kinney, 2005). Centralized utility providers operated the electric grid 
controlling energy availability, security, and market price (Brenner, 2013; Kinney, 2005). 
In 1996, the federal government’s authority, the FERC, moved to decentralize the control 
of the electric grid from its centralized structure to ensure competitive market prices and 




Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) Industrial Control System 
Industrial control systems refer to a group of automated physical processes that 
are responsible for the manufacturing and transportation of energy, chemicals, and 
petroleum products. Energy production relies on a specific industrial control system 
called a SCADA system. SCADA systems govern computerized mechanical processes 
that allow a human control operator to ensure the physical process is safe and reliable 
(Ginter, 2016).  
SCADA systems are an operations technology that is vulnerable to cyber-related 
attacks. These technologies rely on information technology to protect them from cyber-
based attacks (Ginter, 2016). The compromise of SCADA systems by an unauthorized 
intruder could have grave consequences since it is possible that system controls could be 
turned over to the intruder creating unsafe conditions and inducing power loss through 
the shutdown of physical processes (Ginter, 2016; Ten, 2010).  
The cybersecurity of SCADA systems has conflicting priorities, and this conflict 
arises from the integration of information technology with operations technology. 
Information technology security is fixed in data protection, where operations technology 
is focused on deterring unauthorized operations from internal or external threats (Ginter, 
2016). The information technology and operation technology security discord deters 
emphasis on life safety being the number one protection priority separating it from the 




Decentralization of Electric Transmission 
The FERC’s decentralization of the electric market exposed the electric grid to 
vulnerability by increasing its cyber network accessibility to multiple utility providers 
while diminishing leadership decision-making management processes (Tomain, 2002; 
Brenner, 2013; Koppel, 2015; Watts, 2003). Decentralization of controlled energy 
markets increased reliability upon the Internet-dependent industrial control systems to 
operate the entire electric power system from generation to wholesale market trading to 
consumer distribution (Brenner, 2013; Ginter, 2016; Watts, 2003). The increased reliance 
on Internet-dependent industrial control systems to manage all aspects of energy 
management (generation, transmission, distribution, and trade) unlocked the door to 
increased cyber vulnerability (Ginter, 2016; Watts, 2003).  
The federal government placed energy governance responsibility on the FERC. 
FERC, in turn, created a research and development organization called the NERC to 
identify energy utility best practices, establish regulations governing reliability, and 
protect critical electric infrastructure (Watts, 2003). After the September 11, 2001 
terrorist attacks, protecting the energy sector was given priority. NERC instituted an 
Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center (EISAC) to assist with electric 
sector security, counter-terrorism, policy making, and communication between the utility 
industry and the federal government (Watts, 2003). 
Electricity Grid Public Policy and Cyber Space Governance Issues 
As previously stated, the bulk electrical network is vulnerable to cyber and 




by the Internet-dependent industrial control systems, such as EM systems, the cyberspace 
needs strict regulations. In 2015, the U.S. government instituted several public policies to 
protect the energy infrastructure from cyber and physical attacks. The policies enacted 
included Fixing America's Surface Transportation Act, Senate Bill S.2012, Physical 
Security Reliability Standard, Critical Electric Infrastructure Security, Strategic 
Transformer Reserve, Energy Policy Modernization Act of 2015, Cybersecurity Threats, 
and Enhanced Grid Security (Parfomak, 2016). These policies had one thing in common, 
they all addressed the need for enhanced cyber and physical security from energy 
providers but fell short on how to protect the electric grid from physical attack and 
cyberspace intrusions. The regulations do not require the cyberspace to be regulated and 
do not propose measures on how to accomplish cyber governing; in fact, the cyberspace 
is not regulated spurring debate over legal authority, good governance, increased utility 
regulation, and the instruments to do so (Demchak, 2010; Mody, 2001). This gap in 
cyberspace governance enhances the threat of a cyber-attack on the electric grid. 
Cybersecurity Regulation and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 
Strict regulation imposed by the FERC authorities increases with each event 
(cyber, environmental, reliability, etc.) that occurs. Regulations require organizations to 
improve protective measures, which usually involves costly investments to show 
regulatory compliance. Although, energy companies are required to adhere to and make 
substantial investments for regulatory compliance, they are excluded from financial relief 
during federally-declared disasters. The federal government claims energy is a critical 




affordability with no financial support for investor-owned utilities or privately-held 
organizations to recover from a disaster (Stafford Act, 2016). Adversaries of the electric 
grid may be aware of this lack of federal government support and may look to exploit this 
gap as a means of resource exhaustion.  
The Internet network and the digital cyberspace is not well regulated by an 
administrative authority (Determan, 2013; Kerr, 2003; Wu, 2013). Lack of regulation 
stems from poorly defined cybercrime bills that do not specifically address authorized 
and unauthorized access (Determan, 2013; Kerr, 2003; Wu, 2013).  These terms are 
referenced in the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and specifically relate to breach of user 
contracts leading to civil penalties and not criminal penalties (Determan, 2013; Kerr, 
2003; Wu, 2013). The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act was enacted to protect 
government and financial institutions’ “protected computer” systems from misuse by 
external or internal computer users (Determan, 2013; Kerr, 2003; Wu, 2013). In 2008, the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act was amended to include criminal prosecution of persons 
who exploit protected computer systems (U.S. Congress, 2017). The amendment 
recognized illegal activity, such as larceny, and allows for criminal prosecution of those 
unlawful activities under those specific criminal laws (U.S. Congress, 2017). The bill 
falls short and does not make the act of unauthorized computer access a criminal action 
for privately-held computer systems or networks. An Internet network that lacks specific 
criminal regulation and does not protect computer systems outside government or 




negative consequence. The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act was criticized by Wu (2013) 
describing it as the act as the worst law in technology. 
Cyber Intelligent Leadership 
In 2008, Senator McConnell raised cybersecurity concerns at the Annual Threat 
Assessment telling congressional leaders that U.S. commerce was not well protected or 
prepared to manage a cyber-attack and raising questions about how the government 
would interact with the private sector to improve the nation’s cybersecurity (Sayers, 
2008). Sayers (2008) and Koppel (2015) both questioned the ability of current 
government and private sector executive leadership’s ability to provide useful guidance 
on cybersecurity strategy noting a fundamental lack of computer network security 
knowledge. Congressional party leaders in Washington acknowledged an immediate need 
for professional development from both public and private sector leaders who have a 
depth of cyber knowledge that will improve the national cyber resiliency strategy 
(Sayers, 2008). 
Electric Industry Attacks 
The U.S. Department of Energy experienced a cyber intrusion that exfiltrated 
104,000 data records in 2011, 2012, and 2013 (Friedman, 2013). In 2015, the Ukrainian 
electric grid was infected with malware that disrupted electric service to 225,000 
customers for over 6 hours (Foxbrewster, 2016; Ukrainian Journal, 2016). The Ukrainian 
attack is a prime example of grid vulnerability resulting in a cyber-attack that caused 
physical damages to electrical components through compromised SCADA system that 




Salmeron et al., 2003; Ten et al., 2010). Pinging is a term used in the utility industry 
where a command is provided through the SCADA systems to physical system 
components that signal the equipment to open (turn off) or close (turn on) the flow of 
electric current. Electrical grid adversaries could develop software algorithms that intrude 
the power grid’s industrial control systems (SCADA), sending out commands to 
electrical components causing the physical mechanism to fail (Ginter, 2016; Koppel, 
2015; Salmeron et al., 2003; Ten et al., 2010). 
Cyber algorithms designed by Ten et al. (2010) and Salmeron (2003) have the 
capability to manipulate SCADA systems that trick human operators by identifying high 
load electrical imbalances signaling the system to shed load causing the power grid to 
crash or blackout.  The purposes of Ten et al. and Salmeron’s studies were to attack the 
electric grid from the perspective of a terrorist organization with minimal resources to 
identify cyber vulnerabilities. The fact these studies have been conducted implies that 
terrorist or adversarial organizations already possess the capability to cause significant 
cyber and physical damage to the electric grid with few financial or material resources. 
Electric Grid Attack Results 
The primary concern with a cyber or physical attack on the electrical grid is 
power loss. The loss of power resulting from an attack can have consequences to the life 
safety of utility employees and the surrounding population (Ginter, 2016). A life safety 
event could be the immediate upset of a generation facility or short-term power outages 




minute could upset industrial operations causing immediately dangerous to life and health 
conditions for employees and longer-term consequences to commerce.  
Cyber-attacks to the BES have real physical consequences that threaten civility in 
large population centers. The loss of energy for prolonged periods could create situations 
of civil unrest, threaten lifesaving operations at hospitals, create extreme seasonal 
weather environments affecting elderly populations, and cause financial harm to the 
economy. 
Emergency Management (EM) 
The U.S. EMS was modeled from the first nationally declared disaster that 
occurred in Portsmouth, New Hampshire in 1802 (Fugate, 2011). The Portsmouth, New 
Hampshire disaster was a fire that devastated the port city and threatened commerce in 
the new nation (Fugate, 2011). In 1802, Congress provided financial disaster relief that 
assisted the people of New Hampshire to rebuild and incorporate an insurance company 
to help with asset protection (Fugate, 2011). This disaster relief model of providing 
financial assistance to victims of a nationally-declared catastrophe has not changed in 
nearly two centuries.  
 Today’s contemporary EMS evolved to incorporate a physical management 
structure known as the Incident Command System that organizes actions and 
communications to one authority (Canton, 2011). The Incident Command System was 
developed by the Wildland Fire Departments in California in the mid-1970s to manage 
mass resources and firefighting operations. The Incident Command System was 




attacks on September 11, 2001. The cumbersomeness of the Incident Command Systems 
has excluded cybersecurity resources (cyber-based organizations or functions) from 
situational awareness, planning, response, and recovery from new events (Walker, et. al., 
2010). The exclusion of Cybersecurity-based resources from traditional EM may be due 
to a lack of cyber knowledge, tools, response priorities, and responsiveness to a cyber-
based emergency (Friedman, 2013; Ginter, 2016, Koppel, 2015; Walker et al., 2010). 
This gap in EM needs closure to ensure a cyber-attack on the critical electric 
infrastructure can be effectively mitigated. 
Electrical Grid Protection Theory 
The electrical grid protection theory considers the authoritative decision-making 
system that optimizes the phenomenon of electrical grid protection based on the pillars of 
EM, intelligence, and public policy. The three pillars must be in an enhanced state to 
function accurately in the decision-making system’s input/output process.  
Easton’s (1957) political system theory demarcates the authoritative decision-
making processes of society's political system. The political system’s demarcations are 
the inputs from the societal environment that are transformed into consequential outputs 
that take the form of authoritative decisions or public policy (Easton, 1957). The political 
system relies on the inputs to work and decision-making outputs consequently which are 
not unlike other decision-making processes where governance exists. 
Crisis Management (CM) and Cybersecurity Theoretical Frameworks 
Crisis management theory explains mitigation, preparedness, response, and 




external risk matrix process and portfolio archetype that determines the consequential 
probability of risk and severity (Mitroff, 1998). The data derived from the risk model is 
then used by government or business leaders to derive CM decisions.   
SCADA systems are the industrial control mechanisms that govern the physical 
processes in an industrial manufacturing setting (Ginter, 2016; Sommestad, 2012). 
Cybersecurity theory is fixed on the premise that protection of data using information 
technology security approaches produces a secure environment against malware threats 
for electrical utility industrial control systems (Sommestad, 2012). Sommestad's theory 
yielded an input/output SCADA cybersecurity risk model that can be used to assess 
SCADA systems to create security preparedness decisions. 
The CM and cybersecurity theoretical frameworks compliment Easton’s (1957) 
political system theory and the proposed electrical grid resilience theory identifying 
inputs (threats, vulnerabilities, and frequencies) and outputs (preparedness measures) 
using a system to conceive emergency preparedness policy. 
Summary and Conclusions 
The literature search strategy introduced the concepts of the BES, SCADA; the 
decentralization of the electric transmission market; reviewed current cybersecurity law; 
the concepts of EM principles and crisis management; and explained the electrical 
protection theory.  The literature search identified gaps in cybersecurity law to protect 
privately owned organizations from hackers, the lack of cyber threat concepts in EM, and 
lack of cyber knowledge in the management ranks of private organizations. The study 




cybersecurity law, EM, and management knowledge in Chapter 5. Further discussion and 




Chapter 3: Research Method 
Introduction 
As previously stated, the goal of this study was to understand the relationship 
between cybersecurity law, emergency management, and the national electric grid to 
identify if these variables together present a protection strategy against cyber and 
physical harm to the BES. This chapter examines and defines the study’s methodology, 
sources of data collected, ethical concerns, the study’s design, and details the study 
quantitively and qualitative procedures used and the study’s survey tool.  The study’s 
methodology was a mixed method sequential explanatory research design introduced by 
Creswell (2011).  The study’s participant pool was made up of 132 IOUs. Ethical 
concerns of the study were addressed by maintaining study participant confidentiality and 
allowing participants to exit the study at any time. The study’s survey was developed and 
delivered to participants using the software solution SurveyMonkey.    
Method of Study  
I conducted this study using Creswell’s (2011) mixed method sequential 
explanatory research design as shown in Figure 3. The design blends both the 
postpositivism and constructivism worldviews allowing for a flexible and thorough 
method of inquiry. The sequential aspect of the design allowed me to first investigate the 
empirical tenets of the theoretical lenses of the study by questioning the relationship 
between cybersecurity law, EM, and the national electric grid. The results derived from 




collected supportive explanation from participants who had experience with 
cybersecurity law, EM, and the national electric grid. 
 
Figure 3. Creswell’s sequential explanatory mixed methods research design.  
Sources of Data 
The data sources I identified and used for this study were collected from 132 IOU 
companies whose personnel were issued a survey, legal documents, trade association 
documents, personal interviews, and government documents. The Electric Information 
Sharing and Analysis Center issued the survey to their utility companies and 118 IOU 
members completed the survey (see Appendix A). Legal documents and research 
information from the Colorado Information Sharing and Analysis Center, Federal 
Legislature, Appellate Courts, Government Accountability Office, and the National 
Energy Renewable Laboratory was used to gather past and current situational awareness 
that could potentially support or refute the proposed grid resilience theory. I conducted 




members from the private sector based on the results in Strand 1 (see Creswell, 2008, pp. 
80–81). 
Ethical Concerns 
The study participants’ confidentiality was an ethical concern that I kept at the 
forefront of my mind throughout the duration of the study. A confidentiality breach may 
be a perceived risk factor that could cause harm to the study’s participants. This ethical 
concern was considered a low to moderate risk factor, and I addressed it by disabling the 
online survey Internet Protocol address tracking feature and using informed consent 
forms during participant interviews. Interview participants had the right to exit the study 
at any time. The names of study participants were not disclosed in this study. The Walden 
University research approval number for the study was 06-02-17-0537824.  
Study Design 
As previously stated, the study design I used was a mixed methodological 
approach incorporating a sequential explanatory design (see Creswell, 2011). I conducted 
a quantitative inquiry initially, followed by a qualitative review (see Creswell, 2011). I 
selected this plan to conduct an empirical investigation to support the proposed 
conceptual theory with the flexibility to use further investigative techniques to provide 
further supporting narrative.   
I conducted the sequential explanatory design in two research sequences. The first 
was the quantitative sequence that was underpinned by the postpositivist worldview. This 
quantitative phase concluded after the results had been finalized. The second sequence 




The qualitative results provided an opportunity for me to explain targeted findings. The 






Data Collection Procedures 
To collect data for this study, I used Creswell’s (2008) gathering procedure for 
mixed method research. The data collection procedure is visually represented in Figure 4. 
 
       





The quantitative research procedure is as follows: 
1. Quantitative data collection.  
a. Develop quantitative research questions using the Survey Monkey 
instrument  
b.  Sample population identification  
i. Population (N) is 132 IOUs 
ii. Sample population (n) is calculated at 118 using a sample size calculator 
with a confidence level (CL) of 95% and a CI of +/-3.  
iii. Identify research participants within the IOU.  
Research participants will be comprised of individuals who occupy the following 
positions: 
• Executive leaders, 
• Utility personnel,  
• Emergency managers, 
• Trade associations, and 
• Government agencies.  
c. Obtain sample permission(s).  
I used the Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center to socialize and 
gain participation in the research study from their members who represented the 118 IOU 
participants. The organization deployed the participant e-mail letter and study to 




d. Collect data. I developed a Likert scale survey to survey the sample 
population. The survey was deployed using the web-based Survey Monkey application. 
2. Quantitative data analysis 
a. Interpret data and conduct statistical analysis. Nominal and ordinal data 
were collected. I used descriptive statistics and chi-squared to analyze the data. 
Descriptive statistics yielded information describing the population. A Pearson chi-
squared test of independence was used to examine if there is a relationship between the 
variables (see Green, 2013). 
b. Proceed to qualitative data procedure. 
Qualitative Procedures 
The qualitative research procedures are as following:  
3. Interview selection and procedure. 
a. Participant interview selection based on statistical trends identified during 
the quantitative analysis.  
b. I developed interview questions based on quantitative results. Interview 
questions and protocol were prepared prior to data collection. The interview protocol 
ensured the participant’s confidentiality and explained the purpose and scope of the 
research project to the participants. 
4. Qualitative data collection. 
a. I conducted in-person and phone interviews with identified participants. 
The interviews were transcribed for analysis. Recording devices may be used depending 




5. Qualitative data analysis.  
a. I used the NVivo qualitative analysis application for data coding and 
thematic determination. The NVivo analysis assisted in mapping themes and developing 
an Easton input/output model that represents the hypotheses of the study.  
6. Method result and reporting. 
a.  Data results were interpreted, and I determined whether the hypotheses 
were supported or not supported. The findings were reported and the study completed. 
I confirmed the qualitative research validity through the peer review process. Peer 
review from industry and government organizations supported the legitimacy of the study 
and ensured it represented the issues accurately. 
Survey Tool 
I collected quantitative data using a Likert Scale survey specifically developed for 
this study.  Likert Scale surveys are used to measure points of view, arguments, 
frequency of occurrence, significance, consequence, magnitude, and probability of the 
populous being studied (Creswell, 2011). The survey was divided into sections to assure 
research question alignment and variable separation for comparison purposes. A chi-
squared statistical analysis was used to investigate the distribution and means of the 
variables of the study to determine if a relationship existed. I used univariate descriptive 
statistical analysis to describe the sample population.  
The first section of the survey collected data to support the study’s first research 
question: To what extent is there a relationship between EM and the protection of the 




investigating the “extent of” EM used by the sample population as it related to protection 
of the national electrical grid.  
Section 2 of the survey examined Research Question 2: To what extent is there a 
relationship between cybersecurity law and the protection of the national electrical grid? 
Survey Questions 16 through 34 asked questions related to a cybersecurity law called the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. As previously stated, the Computer Fraud and Abuse 
Act is the foundational law for providing legal computer system or network intrusion 
protections to government and financial sectors (U.S Congress, 2017). These questions 
assessed the sample population’s familiarity with and use of the law to support the extent 
to which cybersecurity law has a relationship to provide protection to the national 
electrical grid.  
The final section of the survey, Questions 35 through 37, examined if: 
cybersecurity law and EM support a framework to protect the national electrical grid? 
These questions focused on the sample population’s knowledge and application of 
cybersecurity law and EM to determine if these two independent variables supported a 
framework to protect the national electrical grid dependent variable. The remaining 
Survey Questions 38 through 45 collected data that define the sample population by size, 
type, role, and cybersecurity event experience. The close of the survey provided an option 
for participants to provide their contact information if they wished to participate in a 
follow-up interview. The study’s survey can be viewed in Appendix A. 
I developed the survey using the Internet-based Survey Monkey 




survey service that has been widely accepted by researchers and universities in today’s 
digital age. Survey Monkey allows the researcher to develop a wide variety of surveys 
both quantitative and qualitative data, conducts statistical analysis, provides graphical 
data representations, and can identify common themes. Survey Monkey is a convenient 
tool that allows study participants to complete the survey with ease and allows 
researchers to view collected data nearly instantaneously.  
Survey Monkey provides solutions to ethical concerns such as confidentiality and 
anonymity by selecting specific survey design option. Survey Monkey allows the 
researcher to switch the Internet Protocol option to “No” to ensure participant anonymity 
and confidentiality. In the survey in this study, I did not track the Internet Protocol of 
participants to ensure their safety and confidentiality. 
Summary 
The purpose of the mixed method sequential explanatory study was to gain an 
understanding of the relationship between cybersecurity law, EM, and the national 
electric grid. An understanding of these variables determines conclusions of if they 
support a protective framework for the national electric grid and support the conceptual 
electric grid protection theory. The study was split into quantitative and qualitative 
strands. The quantitative strand was performed by issuing a survey to 132 IOUs followed 
by a qualitative inquiry of participants who volunteered for follow-up interviews. The 
study’s design was selected for its flexibility in using multiple investigative techniques. 




time to leave the study at any time. Study results and interpretations are evaluated in 




Chapter 4: Results  
Introduction  
In this study, I examined to what extent cybersecurity law and EM provide a 
framework to protect the national electric grid. Three research questions and hypotheses 
provided a foundation for this study, where I used Creswell's sequential explanatory 
mixed methods research approach. The research questions and hypotheses that guided 
this study were: 
RQ1: To what extent is there a relationship between EM and the protection of the 
national electrical grid?  
H01: EM principles focus on physical events and not cybersecurity events, 
leaving the national electrical grid vulnerable to threats.  
RQ2: To what extent is there a relationship between cybersecurity law and the 
protection of the national electrical grid?  
H02: Cybersecurity law does not provide a legal means to protect the 
national electrical grid.  
 RQ3: Does cybersecurity law and EM support a framework to protect the 
national electrical grid?  
H03: Cybersecurity law and EM currently does not provide a framework to 
protect the national electrical grid. 
The data I collected to answer the research questions were obtained through the 




Participant follow-up interviews were planned to be conducted, but the volunteers who 
expressed interest had left the study at that point. 
This chapter will include the data I gathered to answer the research questions and 
hypotheses of the study. I will present the findings of the study through the sequential 
explanatory design using the postpositivist and constructivist theoretical lenses. 
Participant Demographics 
In this study, I invited individuals representing the utility industry in the United 
States to participate in the initial research survey through the EISAC on June 15, 2017. A 
total of 183 individual participants completed the survey. Fifty-two participants (28%) 
represented municipal utilities, where 131 participants (72%) represented IOUs as shown 
in Table 1. There were seven executive leaders (3%), eight senior leaders (5%), two 
director level leaders (1%), 15 midlevel managers (8%), 16 front line managers (9%), and 
135 participants (74%) who did not provide a position type response. The general 
distribution of participants who indicated a position type was 26%.    Participants 
represented the following areas in the utility area: corporate services (53%), operations 
generation (9%), operations distribution (7%), operations transmission (3%), security 





My primary focus in this study was on IOUs. The results from the public utility 
participants were not analyzed. However, the data collected from the public utility 
participants may be used in a future study. 
The names of the IOUs were not included in the study as a measure to provide 
participant confidentiality. The results from Survey Questions 1 and 44 provided 
sufficient evidence to reasonably support that data were collected from the minimum 
number (118) of IOUs required to complete the study. The participants indicated they 
represented the following seven regions throughout the United States: West (27%), 









The study was comprised of a survey that asked participants 45 questions to 
determine whether empirical evidence existed to support the proposed electric grid 
protection theory. The electric grid protection theory suggests that in an optimized state, 
the authoritative decision-making system will use EM, intelligence, and public policy as a 
strategic approach to protect the national electrical grid from cyber and physical threats.  
The survey I used in the quantitative phase of the study yielded support for the proposed 
conceptual theory by identifying gaps within the areas of EM, public policy (specifically 
cybersecurity law), and intelligence in the form of participant knowledge. I also 
conducted a qualitative review of government-related documents and cybersecurity law 
case studies following the completion of the quantitative strand of the study. Participant 
follow-up interviews were not conducted in the qualitative portion of the procedure since 
most participants declined to participate in the qualitative strand. Four participants who 
expressed an interest in contributing to follow-up interviews decided to leave the study 
prior to beginning the qualitative segment. These participants who left the study were 
concerned about divulging their IOU’s confidential proprietary information. It can be 
inferred that most participants declined the follow-up interviews due to concerns of 
sharing company proprietary information. I conducted an analysis of participant 
comments, together with a review of both cybersecurity case law and government 
regulations, to support the qualitative strand of the study. 
I divided the survey study results into categories to represent the three study 




35, and 36 addressed cybersecurity law; and Questions 13, 14, and 25 through 34 
addressed the national electric grid. The remaining questions collected information about 
the study participants as I previously summarized at the beginning of this chapter.  
I primarily used a statistical analysis technique that included descriptive statistics 
and chi-squared comparative analysis to examine the data. Descriptive statistics, precisely 
the mode, was used to show the frequency of the responses and to show the percentage of 
responses. The chi-square analysis was used to determine significance to support or reject 
the research hypotheses of the study. 
Quantitative Analytical Results 
As I stated previously, 131 participants representing 118 IOUs participated in this 
research study. I administered a survey containing 45 questions to the participants. 
Participants completed the survey using the Survey Monkey program. The SPSS 
statistical software was used to perform both descriptive and chi-square statistical 
analysis on the survey results.  
The data I received from the survey used two primary response sets: 
• Strongly Disagree, Agree, Disagree, Strongly Agree, and Do Not Know 
• Not Confident, Somewhat Confident, Very Confident, and Not Applicable 
The response sets were coded in SPSS as shown in Table 2.  
Table 2 










Strongly Agree 4 
Do Not Know 5 – Missing Value 
Not Confident 1 
Somewhat Confident 2 
Confident 3 
Very Confident 4 
Not Applicable 5 – Missing Value  
I reverse coded Question 17 and used it as a control question to demonstrate the 
difference between the participants’ preceptive knowledge versus their actual knowledge 
of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. Sixty-six percent of participants indicated that 
they did not know about the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, while 34% of participants 
stated that they did know about the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act but failed to answer 
the control question accurately. The 66% of participants that acknowledged they did not 
know about the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and those that answered the control 
question inaccurately led to Questions 19 through 24 not being included in the statistical 
analysis to avoid error in the statistical analysis. The question data responses were 
organized into groups representing the variables of the study. 
Descriptive Statistic Analysis Summary 
As I previously stated, the study was divided into the three variable categories of 
EM, cybersecurity law, and the national electric grid. The survey results were not 
normally distributed, so I transformed the results of the survey into median scores for 
statistical analysis. The result median scores were used to derive to a more accurate 




Participants who indicated “I do not know,” “Not applicable,” or those who did 
not provide an answer to a survey question were identified as missing values. The 
missing values were not included in the statistical analysis. The results for the study 
variables of EM, cybersecurity, and the national electric grid are summarized in Table 3. 
Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics 
Variable N Median SD Skewness Missing cases 
Emergency management  131 3.00 .669 -.646 0 
Cybersecurity  116 3.00 .896 -.062 15 
National electric grid 91 2.50 1.09 -.001 40 
  
I conducted chi-square analysis to determine if the data results were supportive or 
nonsupportive of the null hypotheses. Chi-square testing is used to determine the 
relationship between variables. My chi-Square analysis considered the relationship 
between EM, cybersecurity law, and the national electric grid to determine if there was 
quantitative evidence to support the test hypotheses. The results of my chi-square 
analyses are summarized in Table 4. 
Table 4 
Chi Square Results 
 Statistic df p value Alpha 
Pearson Chi Square 62.3 36 .004 0.05 
Phi  .846  .004 0.05 
Cramer’s V .346  .004 0.05 
     
Pearson Chi Square 79.7 36 .000 0.05 
Phi  .936  .000 0.05 
Cramer’s V .382  .000 0.05 




Pearson Chi Square 47.6 18 .000 0.05 
Phi  .724  .000 0.05 
Cramer’s V .418  .000 0.05 
     
The Chi Square analyses for each research question analyzed resulted in a 
significant value that was less than alpha suggesting a failure to reject the null 
hypotheses. The Phi and Cramer’s Five tests suggest there is an association between the 
variables. Therefore, there is quantitative support suggesting emergency management 
principles primarily focus on physical events and not cybersecurity events, cybersecurity 
law does not provide legal protection for the national electric grid, and EM and 
cybersecurity law currently does not provide a framework to protect the national electric 
grid leaving it vulnerable to threats. 
Qualitative Analytical Results Summary 
The second strand of the study would have examined the study participant’s 
qualitative interview responses to support the study’s research questions and further 
explain the quantitative findings. However, most participants declined to participate in 
the qualitative phase of the study preventing the ability to conduct follow-up interviews 
as indicated in the qualitative research procedure presented in Chapter 3. Study 
participants who had indicated they were interested in participating in follow-up 
interviews opted to leave the study due to concerns about divulging their investor owned 
utility’s confidential proprietary information. The absence of the follow-up interview data 





An examination of the comments that participants provided in the study’s survey, 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act case law, Incident Command System literature, and 
government regulation were reviewed to provide further explanation of the study’s 
quantitative results. 
Emergency Management (EM), Cybersecurity Law, and the National Electric Grid 
The first research question and hypotheses examined the extent of the relationship 
between EM and the national electric grid. Specifically examining if EM has shifted its 
focus on physical response to be inclusive of cybersecurity as a measure to reduce the 
vulnerability to the national electric grid. The study quantitatively demonstrated that EM 
emphasis is on physical response and not that of cyber event response. A review of 
Incident Command System publications from Cole (2000), Jain (2003), and Walker 
(2010) suggested the need to integrate cybersecurity into the Incident Command System 
without defining an instruction for that integration. Additionally, the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency’s Industrial Control System Cyber Emergency Response Team 
website did not address integration of cybersecurity into the Incident Command System. 
The review of literature provided support that emergency management has not been 
inclusive of cyber related responses.  
The second research question placed an emphasis on the relationship between 
cybersecurity law and the protection of the national electric grid. Specifically examining 
if cybersecurity law provided a legal strategy to protect the national electric grid. 
Quantitatively demonstrated cybersecurity law did provide a legal conduit to protect the 




applies to the United States government and financial institutions. A case law review 
indicated that 100% of privately owned businesses who tried to apply the Computer 
Fraud and Abuse Act to actors who accessed their computer systems without 
authorization or who exceeded their authorization were overturned in the appellate courts, 
as described in table 5. 
Table 5 





Case Number Judgement  Conviction 
9/14/2001 Chance Vs. 
Avenue A 
No. C00-1964C. Dismissed No 
3/8/2006 International 
Airport Centers 
LLC Vs. Citrin 




No. 07-17116. Dismissed No 
8/8/2011 College Source 
Vs. Academy 
One 
No. 09-56528. Dismissed No 





No. 11-1201. Dismissed No 
7/23/2013 Dresser-Rand 
Vs Jones 
Civil Action No. 
10-2031. 
Dismissed No 
WEC Energy vs. Miller and Kelley demonstrated that an investor owned utility 
attempting to apply the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act is not protected under the law 
leaving the organization without a legal protection strategy from individuals who would 




not provide legal protections from those bad actors that would intrude into investor 
owned utility systems to harm the national electric grid.  
The final research question explores if cybersecurity law and EM support a 
framework to protect the national electric grid. Quantitatively, the study demonstrated 
that the two variables do not support a framework to protect the national electric grid. 
The findings can be further supported by examining Presidential Policy Directive 41 and 
Executive Order on Strengthening Cybersecurity of Federal Networks and Critical 
Infrastructure (Appendix C; Obama, 2016; Trump, 2017). Presidential Directive 41 stated 
the federal government would not play a role in supporting a private organization if 
effected by a cyber event (Obama, 2016). Conversely, the policy expected private 
organizations to support the government in the event of a cyber incident. President 
Trump’s executive order failed to include response support of the private sector and 
affirmed that Presidential Directive 41 be followed (see Appendix D). The lack of 
government support for the private sector leaves the sector vulnerable to cyber related 
threats extending to the national electric grid. The lack of private industry support by the 
U.S. government regarding cybersecurity and the absence of cybersecurity integration 
into the EM principles support the finding that cybersecurity law and EM does not 
currently provide a strategy to protect the national electric grid from harm. 
Electrical Grid Protection Theory 
The research study's quantitative and qualitative findings support the research 
questions hypotheses. The state of the current independent variables, EM, public policy 




Easton's political system theory applied authoritative decision-making principle, if used 
in an optimized state, logically dictates that outcomes would result in undesirable 
decisions. If applied to the protection of the national electrical grid with unoptimized 
variables, logic dictates the results would not provide protective strategies. However, in 
an optimized state, the authoritative decision-making principle, logically dictates 
desirable outcomes. 
The electric grid protection theory relies on optimization in the areas of EM and 
cybersecurity law. Many participants provided neutral responses to the survey questions 
that were coded as missing value. The result provides support for stating the investor 
owned utility population may not have the knowledge in EM and cybersecurity law to 
make optimized decisions regarding protective strategies for the national electric grid. 
Moreover, the lack of support by the U.S. government for the private sector add to the 
difficulty of protecting the national electric grid through current cybersecurity law and 
administrative public policy.  
 Fortunately, through private and public partnership IOU and the U.S. government 
have the opportunity to optimize the areas of EM and cybersecurity law to protect the 
national electric grid from harm. 
Conclusion 
The findings overall supported the research study hypotheses. The results of both 
the quantitative and modified qualitative examination demonstrated the IOU population 
and the study variables are not in an optimized state to provide protective strategies for 




variables are not in an optimized state therefore leading to decisions that may not protect 
the national electric grid from harm. Qualitative reviews of the literature suggest there are 
gaps at the federal government’s policy level to adequately support the integration of 
cybersecurity into the Incident Command System and to be inclusive of legal protections 
for private organizations who experience cyber- related attacks. My full interpretation of 







Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
Introduction 
In this study, I examined elements of a proposed electric grid protection theory. 
The theory is a concept that explains that optimizing elements could establish a strategic 
framework for protecting the national electric grid. The theory variables I assessed in this 
study included EM, cybersecurity law, and their influence on the protection of the 
national electric grid. The study acted as an academic arrangement to the problem of 
protecting the U.S. electrical network from harm. In 2015, the Ukraine experienced an 
electric grid attack while research was being conducted for this study (Ukrainian Journal, 
2016). The Ukraine incident caused by a cyber-attack shut down energy production and 
delivery to 225,000 customers for over 6 hours demonstrating the significance of 
protecting the power grid (Ukrainian Journal, 2016). 
In this study, I identified gaps in cybersecurity law, EM, and IOU employee 
understanding of the study variables. The gaps identified through the literature review in 
Chapter 2 and the completion of the study's survey in Chapter 4 included areas 
concerning criminalizing unauthorized access to computer systems that are not deemed 
by the federal government as protected systems; principles of EM (i.e., incident 
command system, event management planning, and cyber-security integration); 
cybersecurity law; and the national electric grid. In this chapter, I will characterize and 




Interpretation of Findings 
There were three problems and three hypotheses that I examined in this study 
centered around determining the extent that the independent variables had a relationship 
with the national electric grid and if the independent variables supported a framework to 
protect the national electric grid from harm. The research hypotheses I developed to 
forecast the independent variables were not optimized to provide legal protections or a 
current strategy to protect the national electrical grid from damage. Instead, the research 
hypotheses integrated with the introduction of the grid protection theory in that the 
elements of the theory must be optimized so that logical decision outcomes protect the 
national electric grid from both physical and cyber harm. 
 EM incorporates the use of life cycle principles and the physical management 
structure known as the Incident Command System (Canton, 2011). The principles of EM 
include mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery (Canton, 2011). Mitigation is 
the application of measures that will control a threat from causing harmful impacts. The 
survey questionnaire accounted for relief-related content in Questions 3, 6, 8, 12, and 13. 
Preparedness includes activities an organization uses to position their resources to 
respond and recover when a catastrophic event does occur. Preparedness activities 
include emergency planning, personnel training, education, resource procurement, and 
conducting emergency exercises (Canton, 2011). The survey preparation related 
questions were 2, 4, 5, 11, 14, and 15. Response is the deployment of resources and use 
of emergency procedures to protect life, stabilize an incident, and protect property. 




System. Recovery accounts for the restoration actions (Canton, 2011). Restoration can be 
acute or long term depending upon the event impacts. Recovery actions could include 
long term care for displaced individuals and replacement of infrastructure. Survey 
question 7 addressed recovery from power loss.  
The Incident Command System was developed to manage the response to 
physical catastrophes (Canton, 2011). In today's changing threat environment, 
cybersecurity has not been integrated into the Incident Command System creating a gap 
in EM literature (Walker et al., 2010). In Research Question 1 I asked: To what extent is 
there a relationship between EM and the protection of the national electrical grid? 
The questions in Section 1 of the survey were developed to address the first 
research question. Examining the results, I found that many of the respondents answered 
the questions with the neutral response, “I do not know.” The responses by most 
participants in this section suggested the population had a lack understanding of EM and 
its associated principles and management concepts. Quantitatively, the statistical results 
and the relationship to the national electric grid indicated a chi square p-value less than 
alpha (p < 0.05). The chi square value validated that EM places an emphasis on physical 
response and not on cybersecurity response leaving the national electric grid vulnerable 
to threats. The absence of the follow-up interviews with participants to gain insight into 
their understanding of EM concepts leaves a gap of understanding in my interpretation 
between EM and the protection of the national electric grid. Additional research studies 




Cybersecurity concerns have been raised for more than a decade by experts in the 
United States. In congressional research briefs, Fischer (2014, 2016) explained that 
cybersecurity legislation has needed revision and that no overarching framework 
governing cybersecurity exists. Fifty policies address cybersecurity promoting 
information sharing and restoration support between the government and private sector 
(Fischer, 2016). Those 50 policies recently placed by legislative and executive action do 
not address criminal accountability for bad actors but rather focus on workforce 
development, information sharing, research and development, data breach prevention, 
and international policy (Fischer, 2016). Current cybersecurity legislation and executive 
actions do not mention the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, which is legislation that was 
amended in 2008 to make unauthorized access to the computer system in the government 
or financial sector a criminal offense. 
The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act is legislation that criminalizes the intrusion 
of a computer system from an external or internal individual or organization (U.S. 
Congress, 2017). The language of the act is clear on who it protects and who could be 
criminally liable. Legal protection under this act is afforded to government and financial 
sector computer systems; it is not inclusive of the nonfinancial sector private industry 
computer systems or networks. The lack of protection for private sector organizations is a 
gap in the cybersecurity legislation that creates system vulnerabilities exposing the 
national electric grid to harm. In the second section of the survey, I assessed the 
participants’ attitudes towards the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and various legislation 




electric grid. Questions 16 through 24 targeted the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. 
Question 17 was a control question, and if answered in the affirmative the participant's 
responses were discarded. Sixty-six percent of participants responded that they were not 
familiar with the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. Thirty-four percent of participants 
indicated they were familiar with the act but failed the control question. The responses to 
Questions 18 through 24 were not included in the statistical analysis, since these 
responses could have skewed the results.  
With the second research question, I examined the extent of cybersecurity law and 
its relationship to the national electric grid. Specifically, that cybersecurity law does not 
provide a legal means to protect the national electric grid. H02 was quantitatively 
supported with a chi square result less than alpha (p < 0.05). This statistical result was 
indicative of the responses to the questions regarding the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. 
However, the lack of participant interviews could not provide additional insight to 
ascertain participants’ understanding of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act or related 
regulation to the national electric grid. My qualitative review of literature further 
demonstrated the U.S. government’s position to be noninclusive of the private sector as it 
relates to cyber intrusion.  
The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act case law review from 2001 to 2013 provided 
support that cybersecurity law does not protect the private industry. The cases I evaluated 
involved private organizations attempting to use the law against individuals who gained 
unauthorized access to their private computer networks or who exceeded their 




judgment was dismissed, and no convictions were issued. One legal case that I examined 
was WEC Carolina Energy Solutions LLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199 (4th Cir. 2012). The 
case described an IOU organization that filed a criminal law suit against former 
employees who exceeded their internal computer system authorization for personal gain. 
The utility group cited the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and the court dismissed the 
case.  
 A framework is the primary underlayment of a system, concept, or structure. In 
the final research question, I asked: if cybersecurity law and EM support an underlying 
structure to protect the national electric grid?  The statistical chi square analysis resulted 
in a significant statistical value less than alpha (p < 0.05) reinforcing that cybersecurity 
law and EM currently do not provide a framework that protects the national electrical 
grid. The quantitative result could be subjective to argument due to the number of cases 
that were coded as missing value. Furthermore, qualitative interviews of participants 
were not conducted. Additional quantitative and qualitative research may be necessary to 
answer this question.  
In this study, I observed that EM and cybersecurity law, in an unoptimized state, 
cannot produce a framework to protect the national electric grid. In the literature review, I 
identified that EM was focused on physical response and cybersecurity law was not 
inclusive of the private sector outside of financial institutions.  
Electric Grid Protection Theory 
 I modeled the proposed electric grid protection theory on Easton’s political 




that accounted for inputs defined as demands and supports, the decision-making process, 
and the eventual decisions that govern society. Easton described demand inputs by 
placing them into two categories: external environmental factors that influence the 
system and those factors that are generated internally by the system. The internal 
demands in Easton’s explanation describe the motivations of the individuals that 
advanced the system.   
Easton’s (1957) model works well when applied to the electric grid protection 
theory. The inputs in both theories are not dissimilar and rely on environmental demands 
or inputs. The demands of the electric grid protection theory are defined in three 
categories: EM, cybersecurity law, and intelligence. Internal motivations consider the 
actions of individuals to make decisions that govern the generation and delivery of a 
product to its consumers, in this case, electric energy. I have mentioned for this system to 
function and produce desirable output decisions, such as those necessary to protect the 
national electric grid, the three inputs must be in an optimized state. Therefore, it is 
logical to assert that if the system components are not optimized, the decision-making 
outputs will produce undesirable results. 
In this study, I presented a case that supports the current state of the three 
categories being in unoptimized positions to be useful in the decision-making process. I 
hypothesized that the IOU sample population would not be optimized in the EM and 
cybersecurity law categories. The intelligence category had been defined as knowledge of 
the categories of individuals in leadership roles but can extended to the awareness of the 




population of the study reported they did not have knowledge of the topic of the study by 
selecting the neutral response in the survey. The observed lack of awareness by 
participants contributes to the substandard state of the system. An inference can be made 
from these results that until the three categorical inputs in the system are optimized 
decisions, that are made to protect the national electrical grid may be undesirable. 
Additional research and future research will rely on a measure of the IOU 
population's understanding of the input areas. This study was a first step in exploring this 
area of research by introducing a conceptual framework that accounts for an expanded 
view of elements that may impact protection of the national electric grid. 
Limitations of the Study 
Methodological assumptions were built into the study. I assumed research 
participants’ answers to the survey questions were honest. I also assumed that my role in 
the IOU population would instill a level of confidence within the community.  
A constraint to the study was realized following the completion of the quantitative 
investigation. Research participants opted out of the study’s qualitative follow-up 
interviews for concerns of divulging their investor owned utility’s proprietary 
information. The absence of the follow-up interviews data made it difficult to identify 
thematic trends limiting the use of the Nvivo data analysis program. As such, this study 
may not represent the population of investor owned utilities. Additional validation of 
work in this area will be required in the future and will need to include research within 




Finally, this study was not inclusive of all the public or private examinations that 
may have been conducted in this area of interest and needs further investigation.  
Implication for Positive Social Change 
The national electric grid is a network that energizes the mechanisms for 
commerce and a fully functional industrialized nation. The loss of energy to commerce 
could have dire consequences especially if the power failure is prolonged. All sectors of 
our society's critical infrastructure rely on reliable electric power to operate. Protection of 
the national electrical grid is a public policy matter that generates decision making that 
impacts the ability to drive social change. 
The study closed gaps in the literature regarding cybersecurity law, EM, and the 
national electric grid. The electric grid protection theory may assist to advance desirable 
outcomes in the academic, public, and private industries to better secure the national 
electric grid from harm. The findings of this study found the elements that make up the 
theory were not in an optimized state and therefore provides an opportunity to improve 
social change through the optimization process. Criminalizing unauthorized access into 
private organizations computer networks may safeguard the national electric grid while 
extending legal protections not discussed in this study. Improving industry's awareness of 
EM and its principles will only improve industry's ability to coordinate response, promote 
protection of life, improve situational stability and protection of property such as the 





Protecting the national electric grid from physical or cyber harm is top of mind for 
lawmakers and the individuals who work in the electric utility industry. The cyber-attack 
in the Ukraine in December of 2015, made the loss of a life line critical infrastructure a 
reality around the world. The loss of a critical infrastructure and the industrial control 
systems that operate them can create dangerous physical conditions that could 
immediately threaten loss of life, cause severe injury to those who manage the system 
and those whom the system serves. The study found the pillars of the electric grid 
protection theory to not be in a state of optimization, concluding that decisions made to 
protect the national electric grid may be undesirable and may not be effective. 
The variables that make up the electric grid protection theory need to be 
optimized for the decision-making system to work efficiently. Education of the 
population making up the IOU community will help optimize the system. IOU employees 
at all levels would benefit from training in the principles of EM and cybersecurity law. 
The knowledge gained may result in EM leadership levels making effective decisions 
when developing strategy to secure the national electric grid. 
EM principles address the use of the Incident Command System to organize a 
response to an incident. The Incident Command System was shown to be used for 
emergencies that result in physical impacts. The Incident Command System would 
benefit from being updated to be inclusive of a cyber response component to address 
cyber-related emergencies such as an attack on the national electric grid. Ziska (2017) 




Command System (Appendix B). The cybersecurity section would plan the cyber-related 
response, share information, coordinate with intelligence agencies, and preserve evidence 
for criminal investigations as shown in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 6. Ziska’s cybersecurity integration into the Incident Command System. 
Integrating cybersecurity into the Incident Command System provides flexibility 
to the response by setting up a section that focuses on cyber-related issues while 
maintaining operational capability to respond to and stabilize physical emergencies or 
consequences caused by a cyber-attack. Incident Commanders would need to be trained 




include activation during industrial emergencies or when industrial control system 
sabotage is suspected.  
Finally, cybersecurity criminal law must be defined. The Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act address criminal procedures for individuals or organizations who intrude into 
government and financial sector computer systems or networks. The Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act falls short on criminal legal protections of private industry computer systems 
or networks. The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act needs to be amended to be inclusive of 
the private sector and the remaining 14 critical infrastructures it does not address. 
Proposed amended language to the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act can be read in 
Appendix E. Furthermore, presidential directives, executive orders, or new legislation 
need to address regulating the cyberspace, dedicating resources to a policing agency, and 
bringing to justice those individuals who would do harm to our critical infrastructures 
such as the national electric grid. 
Conclusion 
Does cybersecurity law and EM provide a framework to protect the national 
electric grid? The study results expressed the study variables were not optimized as 
observed by the quantitative responses received by the investor owned utility population 
and through the qualitative literature review process. The results of the study do not only 
mean that cybersecurity law and EM do not provide a framework, but rather suggests 
these variables need to be optimized before they can provide a protective strategy for the 




The survey results reported by the IOU sample population is a baseline that can be 
used to quantify the population's knowledge of cybersecurity and EM in future studies. 
The population’s increased awareness in the topic areas will logically produce viable 
inputs that necessitate the electric grid protection theory's decision-making process to 
determine actions to improve protection of the national electric grid. 
The topic area of securing the U.S. energy delivery system has many factors, and 
this study focused on two, cybersecurity law and EM. The future of research in this area 
of interest is vast and the variables plentiful. Future research will need to be inclusive of 
the entire electric utility population. A study examining EM and cybersecurity law 
between IOUs and municipal utilities might make for an excellent study to further 
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Appendix A: Survey Tool 
Introduction 
Thank you for participating in this research study. This goal of this study is to 
understand cybersecurity law and emergency management’s relationship with protection 
of the national electrical grid. The survey is segmented into three sections asking a total 
of 45 questions that focus on emergency management, cybersecurity law, and electrical 
grid protection. The survey should only take 5 to 10 minutes to complete and your 
responses are completely anonymous. If you would like to be considered for a follow-up 
interview, please provide your contact information at the end of the survey.  
Emergency Management 
Other (please specify) 
1. Your organization is best described as a...* 
Investor Owned Utility 
Municipal Utility 
 Not Confident 
Somewhat Confident Confident Very Confident N/A 
Your utility has an ad hoc emergency management program. 
Your utility has an informal undocumented emergency management program. 
Your utility has a formal documented emergency management program. 
2. Does your utility company have the following?* 




3. Your utility company's emergency management program includes a 
cybersecurity vulnerability / threat response process. 
* 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Do not know Agree Strongly Agree N/A 
4. Your utility company's emergency management program includes a 
preparedness element focused on training, drills, and exercises. 
* 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Do not know Agree Strongly Agree N/A 
5. Your utility company's emergency management program incorporates the use 
of the Incident Command System. 
* 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Do not know Agree Strongly Agree N/A 
6. Your utility company's emergency management program includes plans and 
procedures for assessing and addressing electric grid vulnerabilities and threats. 
* 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Do not know Agree Strongly Agree N/A 
7. Your utility company's emergency management program establishes recovery 
procedures for addressing power loss events affecting the electrical grid. 
* 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Do no know Agree Strongly Agree N/A 
8. Your utility company's emergency management program establishes mitigation 





Strongly Disagree Disagree Do not know Agree Strongly Agree N/A 
9. Your utility company's emergency management program addresses procedures 
for both physical and cybersecurity threats/vulnerabilities that could affect the electrical 
grid. 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Do not know Agree Strongly Agree N/A 
10. Your utility company's threat and vulnerability assessment includes cyber 
compromising items that could affect the electrical grid such as malware, social 
engineering, and databreach? 
* 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Do not know Agree Strongly Agree N/A 
11. Your utility company's emergency management program includes procedures 
for long term energy emergencies. 
* 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Do not know Agree Strongly Agree N/A 
12. Your utility company's emergency management program has an integrated 
cyber-emergency response team. 
* 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Do not know Agree Strongly Agree N/A 
13. Your utility company's cybersecurity program is a part of your company's 





Strongly Disagree Disagree Do not know Agree Strongly Agree N/A 
14. Your utility company has an established communication plan that coordinates 
electric grid compromising emergencies with the Electric Sector Coordinating Council. 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Do not know Agree Strongly Agree N/A 
15. Your utility company has an established communication plan that coordinates 
electric grid compromising emergencies with Federal and State government emergency 
managment stakeholders. 
* 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Do not know Agree Strongly Agree N/A 16. Your 
utility company's emergency management program provides protection for the electrical 
grid.* 
Cybersecurity Law 
17. I am familiar with the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.* 
Yes 
No 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Do not know Agree Strongly Agree 
18. The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act protects privately owned utilities from 
external parties that are unauthorized to access your company's computer or network 
systems. 
* 




19. The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act only protects Government and Financial 
sector computer systems from unauthorized parties and internal parties that exceed their 
computer system authorization. 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Do not know Agree Strongly Agree 
20. Your Utility company has attempted to use the Computer Fraud and Abuse 
Act as a measure to deter employees from exceeding their computer system 
authorization. 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Do not know Agree Strongly Agree 
21. Your Utility company has attempted to use the Computer Fraud and Abuse 
Act to deter external unauthorized users from accessing your computer or network 
systems. 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Do not know Agree Strongly Agree 
22. Your utility company has attempted to prosecute external unauthorized users 
criminally for accessing your company's computer or network system. 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Do not know Agree Strongly Agree 
23. Your utility company has successfully prosecuted external unauthorized 
computer system users criminally under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Do not know Agree Strongly Agree 24. The 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act protects investor owned utility electric grid critical 
infrastructure.* 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Do not know Agree Strongly Agree 25. I am familiar 




Strongly Disagree Disagree Do not know Agree Strongly Agree 
26. Your utility company freely shares information about priority critical electric 
infrastructure with Federal, State, and local government agencies under the Fixing 
America's Surface Transportation Act. 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Do not know Agree Strongly Agree 27. I am familiar 
with the North American Energy Security and Infrastructure Act of 2016. 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Do not know Agree Strongly Agree 28. Your utility 
company participates in the Strategic Transformer Reserve Plan.  
Strongly Disagree Disagree Do not know Agree Strongly Agree 29. Your utility 
company participates in the Cyber Sense program to protect the electrical grid. 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Do not know Agree Strongly Agree 
30. The North American Energy Security and Infrastructure Act of 2016 protects 
the electrical grid from harm. 
* 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Do not know Agree Strongly Agree 31. I am familiar 
with the Enhanced Grid Security Act of 2015. 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Do not know Agree Strongly Agree 32. Your utility 
company participates with the Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center. 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Do not know Agree Strongly Agree 
33. The Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center provides valuable 





Strongly Disagree Disagree Do not know Agree Strongly Agree 
34. The Enhanced Grid Security Act of 2015 establishes information sharing 
opportunities to protect the electrical grid from harm. 
Electrical Grid Protection & Organizational Information 
 Not Confident 
Somewhat Confident Confident Very Confident N/A 
Your company's computer system has been infected with a malware. 
Your company can quickly respond to a cybersecurity related emergency that 
impacts electrical grid. 
Your company can stabilize a cybersecurity related emergency that impacts the 
electrical grid. 
Your company can protect its physical industrial control systems from a 
cybersecurity attack. 
35. How confident are you in the following?*  
Strongly Disagree Disagree Do not know Agree Strongly Agree N/A 
An attack on your company's computer system or network could result in real 
physical consequences, damage to property, and place employees or members of the 
public in a life safety situation. 
Your utility company's cyber emergency response team can quickly detect and 
respond to a cyber related malware emergency. 
36. Would you agree or disagree with the following statements about your utility 




Your utility company's cyber emergency response team has adequate tools to 
prevent a malware attack from disrupting control center energy management systems. 
Your utility company's cyber emergency response program is integrated into your 
company's physical emergency response program or incident management program. 
Your utility company's cyber emergency response team coordinates response 
efforts with industrial control system operators. 
Your utility company's cyber emergency response team has backup 
communication plan in the event primary communication systems are disrupted during a 
cyber related incident.  
Strongly Disagree Disagree Do not know Agree Strongly Agree N/A 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Do not know Agree Strongly Agree 
37. Combination of your utility company's  Emergency Management program and 
participation electrical grid security regulations provides a strong strategy for protecting 
the electrical grid from harm. 
Other (please specify) 










Other (please specify) 







Other (please specify) 







41. What is the size of your utility company? 
Large (5,000 to 12,000+) 
Medium (1000 to 5,000) 
Small (<1000) 
Other (please specify) 





Operations – Generation 
Operations – Distribution 
Operations – Transmission 
Security Services – Physical Security 
Security Services – Cyber Security 
Continuity Services 
Emergency Management 
Other (please specify) 
43. What employee level do you represent? 
Executive Leadership 
Senior Leadership 
Director Level Leadership 
Mid-Level Management 
Front Line Management 











45. If you would like to participate in follow-up interviews, please list your name 





Appendix B: Integrating Cybersecurity into the Incident Command System in an 
Evolving Emergency Environment 
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The American threat landscape is changing with the emergence of the cyber threats in the 
form of malicious software or malware. The United States government is struggling on 
ways to ensure the nation is prepared to respond to a cyber-related attack that disrupts 
critical lifeline infrastructure and related systems. New grant opportunities for local and 
State governments are up-and-coming to assess how cyber-related events should be 
managed and how cyber response might fit into the National Incident Management 
System's response framework. The National Incident Management System was adopted 
in response to the September 11, 2001, attack and has been primarily used for 
emergencies that impact the physical world. The introduction of malicious software that 
can cause computer network disruptions can cause real physical consequences to life and 
property. The Incident Command System responds effectively to the physical aspect of 
the emergency it may have to evolve to be inclusive of the information technology and 
cybersecurity professions to manage, investigate, and respond to the cyber threat. This 
article examines the integration of the cybersecurity function into the Incident Command 






Imagine it is the end of the work day and residents of a busy city are going home 
for the day. The city's power company is in the middle of a shift change, and a control 
operator employee notices his computer cursor is moving on its own across the screen. 
The cursor starts to move towards the on-screen breaker controls for substations, and load 
frequency data begins to show tolerance ranges approaching concerning levels. 
Substation breakers start to open, and equipment starts to come off line causing a total 
system failure and mass power outages across the electric distribution network. 
This scenario, unfortunately, is not a hypothetical in the technologically 
dependent world that we live. This scenario is taken directly from what occurred on 
December 23, 2016, in the Western Ukraine region leaving 230,000 residents without 
power and heat. What would have happened if bad actors successfully attacked the 
industrial control systems of a United States power plant, refinery, or local controls such 
as traffic lights, bridges, or water supplies?  How would employees in these sectors 
organize and manage the response?  This article explores the United States response plan 
using the National Incident Management System’s Incident Command System 
Framework and possible solutions to integrate cybersecurity into the response plan.  
National Incident Management System  
The World Trade Center attacks on September 11, 2001, drove the United States 
government to improve coordination of multiple agencies during crisis events initiating 




as the national framework for emergency management (Anderson, 2004). The National 
Incident Management System is an “All Hazards,” governing approach to crisis 
management with the expectation that each local, State, Federal and nongovernmental 
organization use this framework to manage emergency events to ensure common 
response goals are achieved.  
The National Incident Management System is comprised of seven components 
including indoctrination, training, resource management, implementation and reporting, 
alerts, Federal Emergency Management Agency regional contacts, and the Incident 
Command System. As previously stated, this article will focus on the Incident Command 
System. The Incident Command System is a framework that promotes government and 
nongovernmental organization interoperability when working on small to large scale 
incidents (Anderson, 2004).  
Incident Command System 
The Incident Command System first emerged following the 1970 California 
wildfire season. The wildfire season was devastating to the California landscape and 
government resources to the extent that communication and support coordination were 
troubling. In 1972, two years after the devastating wildfires in California, the United 
States Congress chartered the Firefighting Resources of Southern California Organized 
for Potential Emergencies (FIRESCOPE) coalition to develop a multi-agency response 
process to address complex emergencies (Cole, 2000; FEMA, 1987).  The FIRESCOPE 
coalition adjourned providing the nation with a modern emergency management 




The Incident Command System is a management structure that simply organizes 
the response to emergencies. The Incident Command System is structured providing the 
ability to be fluidly scalable at any point during the lifecycle of an emergency. The 
Incident Command System is made up a Command Staff and General Staff. The 
Command Staff consists of the Incident Commander, Public Information Officer, and 
Safety Officer. The Incident Commander is the individual responsible for every aspect of 
the emergency response. The Incident Commander has an overarching operational 
authority and is responsible for developing response strategies, operational tactics, 
resources, and financial tracking. The Public Information Officer is responsible for 
incident communications to the outward facing public, media, and community 
stakeholders. The Safety Officer supports the Incident Commander to assist with the 
mitigation of situational threats and is responsible for the wellbeing of the emergency 
responders and the public.  
The General Staff of the Incident Command System is comprised of four primary 
sections. The four major sections are operations, logistics, administration, and finance. 
These areas are led by section leaders known as “Chiefs” that report directly to the 
Incident Leader. The four sections can be scaled up or down adding or removing 




The Section Chiefs are responsible for executing the tactical operations 
designated to each section by the Incident Commander. The Operations Chief focuses on 
actions that support life safety, incident stabilization, and protection of property. The 
Logistics Chief organizes resources that support the overall incident response operation. 
The Administrative Chief conducts managerial duties that support tracking and 
monitoring of personnel time, payment, and schedules while the Finance Chief manages 








The Incident Command System is a versatile management structure that organizes 
incident response no matter how many individuals respond or how many different 
response agencies participate.  
Maturing the Incident Command System   
Can the Incident Command System be matured to accommodate a changing threat 
environment?  The short answer is yes. The Incident Command System is structured to be 
flexible for accommodating an addition to the General Staff for a specific tactical 
function. In 2013, the Federal government developed guidance to include an intelligence 
and investigation function into the National Incident Management System’s Incident 
Command System. The intelligence and investigation function was identified as a critical 
component to collect information surrounding a set of emergency circumstances and 
therefore was added to the Incident Command System’s general staff as seen in figure 2 
(Department of Homeland Security, 2013).  
The maturation of the Incident Command System to include the intelligence and 
investigation section was a result of each emergency need to gather critical information to 
explain the cause, contributing factors, and identify lessons learned (Department of 
Homeland Security, 2013). The National Preparedness System must continue to adapt to 




changing emergency environments to ensure maturation and consistent response goals 
continue to be attained.  
Cybersecurity Function of the Incident Command System 
The National Incident Management System's scalability and flexibility allow for a 
Cybersecurity Function to be integrated into the Incident Command System. The 
Cybersecurity Function permits for the investigation, information collection, analysis, 
and sharing of data that could identify the origin of a cyber incident or attack. If the 
emergency or incident was determined to be the result of a cyber-attack, the 
Cybersecurity Function would lead the investigation and operational response. If the 
cyber-attack were determined to be a criminal act, the Cybersecurity Function would 
share the information with the proper operational enforcement authorities.   
In today's cyber threat environment, emergency response personnel should 
consider a potential cyber incident as a potential cause of an incident and take necessary 
action to determine causality while upholding the response objectives to protect life, 
stabilize the incident, and protect property. The Cybersecurity Function should be 
integrated into the Incident Command System to efficiently detect and respond to 
cybersecurity threats that potentially cause emergencies that have real physical 
consequences such as the disruption of industrial control systems, network systems, 
energy systems, transportation systems, or any disruption of lifeline critical 
infrastructure.  
The Cybersecurity Function should be installed in the General Staff Section of the 




incident as shown in figure 3. The function may be combined with other general staff 
sections to form task force operations to understand the nature of the incident further, 
share information and ensure primary response objectives are completed. 
How would Cybersecurity Participate in Preparedness Activities? 
The Cybersecurity Function, before the beginning of an incident, could be used to 
attain system data, conduct penetration testing, and address identified system 
vulnerabilities. The Cybersecurity Function could establish a centralized information 
monitoring center to identify system threats that could potentially affect Internet 
dependent systems such as supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems 
and industrial control systems. Preparedness activities could include planning for a cyber 
related response, information sharing, coordination with intelligence agencies, and 
transferring information evidence for criminal investigation by enforcement authorities.  
Cybersecurity Function Organization 




The National Incident Management System is organized into Branches, Groups, 
and Divisions to ensure proper incident scalability. The Cybersecurity Function could be 
organized into Groups that represent various mission areas. The Cybersecurity Function 
Section Chief would be responsible for increasing the span of control activating Groups 
when necessary. The Groups’ activation would be based on the needs and scope of the 
incident and could include:  
• Analyst Group: Provide tactical and strategic level analysis of cyber threats, 
vectors, and actors supporting the defense of computer network operations.  
• Forensic Group: Provide forensic analysis of computer network operations to 
investigate data, preserve malicious data as evidence, and determine routes of 
the system or network entry. 
• Intelligence Group: Monitor computer network systems and other data 
sources to predict nefarious cyber actor behaviors, determine if threats are 





• Data Evidence Group: Manage preserved data evidence and share it with 
agencies or organizations for future criminal prosecution.  
Summary 
The Cybersecurity Function as an addition to the Incident Command System aligns with 
the National Incident Management System’s mission to provide a flexible and scalable 
framework for incident response. The integration of a Cybersecurity Function could 
provide enhanced situational awareness, information sharing, and tactical cyber defense 
operations during an incident where a cyber-attack is suspected. The function is 




necessary when a critical infrastructure fails and should be activated by the Incident 







Appendix C: Presidential Policy Directive 41 United States Cyber Incident Coordination 
PRESIDENTIAL POLICY DIRECTIVE/PPD-41 
SUBJECT: United States Cyber Incident Coordination 
The advent of networked technology has spurred innovation, cultivated knowledge, 
encouraged free expression, and increased the Nation’s economic prosperity. However, 
the same infrastructure that enables these benefits is vulnerable to malicious activity, 
malfunction, human error, and acts of nature, placing the Nation and its people at risk. 
Cyber incidents are a fact of contemporary life, and significant cyber incidents are 
occurring with increasing frequency, impacting public and private infrastructure located 
in the United States and abroad. 
United States preparedness efforts have positioned the Nation to manage a broad range of 
threats and hazards effectively. Every day, Federal law enforcement and those agencies 
responsible for network defense in the United States manage, respond to, and investigate 
cyber incidents in order to ensure the security of our information and communications 
infrastructure. The private sector and government agencies have a shared vital interest in 
protecting the Nation from malicious cyber activity and managing cyber incidents and 
their consequences. The nature of cyberspace requires individuals, organizations, and the 
government to all play roles in incident response. Furthermore, effective incident 
response efforts will help support an open, interoperable, secure, and reliable information 




international security, fosters free expression, and reinforces the privacy and security of 
our citizens. 
While the vast majority of cyber incidents can be handled through existing policies, 
certain cyber incidents that have significant impacts on an entity, our national security, or 
the broader economy require a unique approach to response efforts. These significant 
cyber incidents demand unity of effort within the Federal Government and especially 
close coordination between the public and private sectors. 
I. Scope  
This Presidential Policy Directive (PPD) sets forth principles governing the Federal 
Government’s response to any cyber incident, whether involving government or private 
sector entities. For significant cyber incidents, this PPD also establishes lead Federal 
agencies and an architecture for coordinating the broader Federal Government response. 
This PPD also requires the Departments of Justice and Homeland Security to maintain 
updated contact information for public use to assist entities affected by cyber incidents in 
reporting those incidents to the proper authorities. 
II. Definitions  
Cyber incident. An event occurring on or conducted through a computer network that 
actually or imminently jeopardizes the integrity, confidentiality, or availability of 
computers, information or communications systems or networks, physical or virtual 
infrastructure controlled by computers or information systems, or information resident 




information system, system security procedures, internal controls, or implementation that 
could be exploited by a threat source. 
Significant cyber incident. A cyber incident that is (or group of related cyber incidents 
that together are) likely to result in demonstrable harm to the national security interests, 
foreign relations, or economy of the United States or to the public confidence, civil 
liberties, or public health and safety of the American people. 
III. Principles Guiding Incident Response 
In carrying out incident response activities for any cyber incident, the Federal 
Government will be guided by the following principles: 
Shared Responsibility. Individuals, the private sector, and government agencies have a 
shared vital interest and complementary roles and responsibilities in protecting the Nation 
from malicious cyber activity and managing cyber incidents and their consequences. 
Risk-Based Response. The Federal Government will determine its response actions and 
the resources it brings to bear based on an assessment of the risks posed to an entity, our 
national security, foreign relations, the broader economy, public confidence, civil 
liberties, or the public health and safety of the American people. 
Respecting affected entities. To the extent permitted under law, Federal Government 
responders will safeguard details of the incident, as well as privacy and civil liberties, and 
sensitive private sector information, and generally will defer to affected entities in 
notifying other affected private sector entities and the public. In the event a significant 




incident, Federal responders will coordinate their approach with the affected entities to 
the extent possible. 
Unity of Governmental Effort. Various government entities possess different roles, 
responsibilities, authorities, and capabilities that can all be brought to bear on cyber 
incidents. These efforts must be coordinated to achieve optimal results. Whichever 
Federal agency first becomes aware of a cyber incident will rapidly notify other relevant 
Federal agencies in order to facilitate a unified Federal response and ensure that the right 
combination of agencies responds to a particular incident. State, local, tribal, and 
territorial (SLTT) governments also have responsibilities, authorities, capabilities, and 
resources that can be used to respond to a cyber incident; therefore, the Federal 
Government must be prepared to partner with SLTT governments in its cyber incident 
response efforts. The transnational nature of the Internet and communications 
infrastructure requires the United States to coordinate with international partners, as 
appropriate, in managing cyber incidents. 
Enabling Restoration and Recovery. Federal response activities will be conducted in a 
manner to facilitate restoration and recovery of an entity that has experienced a cyber 
incident, balancing investigative and national security requirements, public health and 
safety, and the need to return to normal operations as quickly as possible. 
IV. Concurrent Lines of Effort 
In responding to any cyber incident, Federal agencies shall undertake three concurrent 
lines of effort: threat response; asset response; and intelligence support and related 




fourth concurrent line of effort to manage the effects of the cyber incident on its 
operations, customers, and workforce. 
Threat response activities include conducting appropriate law enforcement and national 
security investigative activity at the affected entity’s site; collecting evidence and 
gathering intelligence; providing attribution; linking related incidents; identifying 
additional affected entities; identifying threat pursuit and disruption opportunities; 
developing and executing courses of action to mitigate the immediate threat; and 
facilitating information sharing and operational coordination with asset response. 
Asset response activities include furnishing technical assistance to affected entities to 
protect their assets, mitigate vulnerabilities, and reduce impacts of cyber incidents; 
identifying other entities that may be at risk and assessing their risk to the same or similar 
vulnerabilities; assessing potential risks to the sector or region, including potential 
cascading effects, and developing courses of action to mitigate these risks; facilitating 
information sharing and operational coordination with threat response; and providing 
guidance on how best to utilize Federal resources and capabilities in a timely, effective 
manner to speed recovery.  
Threat and asset responders will share some responsibilities and activities, which may 
include communicating with affected entities to understand the nature of the cyber 
incident; providing guidance to affected entities on available Federal resources and 
capabilities; promptly disseminating through appropriate channels intelligence and 
information learned in the course of the response; and facilitating information sharing and 




Intelligence support and related activities facilitate the building of situational threat 
awareness and sharing of related intelligence; the integrated analysis of threat trends and 
events; the identification of knowledge gaps; and the ability to degrade or mitigate 
adversary threat capabilities. 
An affected Federal agency shall engage in a variety of efforts to manage the impact of a 
cyber incident, which may include maintaining business or operational continuity; 
addressing adverse financial impacts; protection of privacy; managing liability risks; 
complying with legal and regulatory requirements (including disclosure and notification); 
engaging in communications with employees or other affected individuals; and dealing 
with external affairs (e.g., media and congressional inquiries). The affected Federal 
agency will have primary responsibility for this line of effort. 
When a cyber incident affects a private entity, the Federal Government typically will not 
play a role in this line of effort, but it will remain cognizant of the affected entity’s 
response activities, consistent with the principles above and in coordination with the 
affected entity. The relevant sector-specific agency (SSA) will generally coordinate the 
Federal Government’s efforts to understand the potential business or operational impact 
of a cyber incident on private sector critical infrastructure. 
V. Architecture of Federal Government Response Coordination for Significant Cyber 
Incidents1 
In order to respond effectively to significant cyber incidents, the Federal Government 
will coordinate its activities in three ways: 




The Cyber Response Group (CRG), in support of the National Security Council (NSC) 
Deputies and Principals Committees, and accountable through the Assistant to the 
President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism (APHSCT) to the NSC chaired by 
the President, shall coordinate the development and implementation of United States 
Government policy and strategy with respect to significant cyber incidents affecting the 
United States or its interests abroad. 
National Operational Coordination  
Agency Enhanced Coordination Procedures. Each Federal agency that regularly 
participates in the CRG, including SSAs, shall establish and follow enhanced 
coordination procedures as defined in the annex to this PPD in situations in which the 
demands of responding to a significant cyber incident exceed its standing capacity. 
Cyber Unified Coordination Group. A Cyber Unified Coordination Group (UCG) shall 
serve as the primary method for coordinating between and among Federal agencies in 
response to a significant cyber incident as well as for integrating private sector partners 
into incident response efforts, as appropriate. A Cyber UCG shall be formed at the 
direction of the NSC Principals Committee, Deputies Committee, or the CRG, or when 
two or more Federal agencies that generally participate in the CRG, including relevant 
SSAs, request its formation. A Cyber UCG shall also be formed when a significant cyber 
incident affects critical infrastructure owners and operators identified by the Secretary of 
Homeland Security as owning or operating critical infrastructure for which a cyber 
incident could reasonably result in catastrophic regional or national effects on public 




A Cyber UCG will normally consist of Federal lead agencies for threat response, asset 
response, and intelligence support, but will also include SSAs, if a cyber incident affects 
or is likely to affect sectors they represent. In addition, as required by the scope, nature, 
and facts of a particular significant cyber incident, a Cyber UCG may include 
participation from other Federal agencies, SLTT governments, nongovernmental 
organizations, international counterparts, or the private sector. 
Following the formation of a Cyber UCG, Federal agencies responding to the incident 
shall assign appropriate senior executives, staff, and resources to execute the agency’s 
responsibilities as part of a Cyber UCG. The Cyber UCG is intended to result in unity of 
effort and not to alter agency authorities or leadership, oversight, or command 
responsibilities. Unless mutually agreed upon between agency heads or their designees, 
and consistent with applicable legal authorities such as the Economy Act of 1932 (31 
U.S.C. 1535), Federal departments and agencies will maintain operational control over 
their respective agency assets. 
Federal lead agencies. In order to ensure that the Cyber UCG achieves maximum 
effectiveness in coordinating responses to significant cyber incidents, the following 
agencies shall serve as Federal lead agencies for the specified line of effort: 
In view of the fact that significant cyber incidents will often involve at least the 
possibility of a nation-state actor or have some other national security nexus, the 
Department of Justice, acting through the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the 





The Department of Homeland Security, acting through the National Cybersecurity and 
Communications Integration Center, shall be the Federal lead agency for asset response 
activities. 
The Office of the Director of National Intelligence, through the Cyber Threat Intelligence 
Integration Center, shall be the Federal lead agency for intelligence support and related 
activities. 
Drawing upon the resources and capabilities across the Federal Government, the Federal 
lead agencies are responsible for: 
Coordinating any multi-agency threat or asset response activities to provide unity of 
effort, to include coordinating with any agency providing support to the incident, to 
include SSAs in recognition of their unique expertise; 
Ensuring that their respective lines of effort are coordinated with other Cyber UCG 
participants and affected entities, as appropriate; 
Identifying and recommending to the CRG, if elevation is required, any additional 
Federal Government resources or actions necessary to appropriately respond to and 
recover from the incident; and 
Coordinating with affected entities on various aspects of threat, asset, and affected entity 
response activities through a Cyber UCG, as appropriate. 
 Field-Level Coordination 
Field-level representatives of the Federal asset or threat response lead agencies shall 




effort with each other and the affected entity. Such representatives may be co-located 
with the affected entity. 
VI. Unified Public Communications 
The Departments of Homeland Security and Justice shall maintain and update as 
necessary a fact sheet outlining how private individuals and organizations can contact 
relevant Federal agencies about a cyber incident. 
VII. Relationship to Existing Policy  
Nothing in this directive alters, supersedes, or limits the authorities of Federal agencies to 
carry out their functions and duties consistent with applicable legal authorities and other 
Presidential guidance and directives. This directive generally relies on and furthers the 
implementation of existing policies and explains how United States cyber incident 
response structures interact with those existing policies. In particular, this policy 
complements and builds upon PPD-8 on National Preparedness of March 30, 2011. By 
integrating cyber and traditional preparedness efforts, the Nation will be ready to manage 







Appendix D: Strengthening Cybersecurity of Federal Networks and Critical 
Infrastructure 
EXECUTIVE ORDER 
- - - - - - - 
STRENGTHENING THE CYBERSECURITY OF FEDERAL NETWORKS AND 
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
 
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United 
States of America, and to protect American innovation and values, it is hereby ordered as 
follows: 
Section 1. Cybersecurity of Federal Networks.  
(a)  Policy. The executive branch operates its information technology (IT) on behalf of 
the American people. Its IT and data should be secured responsibly using all United 
States Government capabilities. The President will hold heads of executive departments 
and agencies (agency heads) accountable for managing cybersecurity risk to their 
enterprises. In addition, because risk management decisions made by agency heads can 
affect the risk to the executive branch as a whole, and to national security, it is also the 
policy of the United States to manage cybersecurity risk as an executive branch 
enterprise.  




(i)    Cybersecurity risk management comprises the full range of activities undertaken to 
protect IT and data from unauthorized access and other cyber threats, to maintain 
awareness of cyber threats, to detect anomalies and incidents adversely affecting IT and 
data, and to mitigate the impact of, respond to, and recover from incidents. Information 
sharing facilitates and supports all of these activities. 
(ii)   The executive branch has for too long accepted antiquated and difficult–to-defend 
IT. 
(iii)  Effective risk management involves more than just protecting IT and data currently 
in place. It also requires planning so that maintenance, improvements, and modernization 
occur in a coordinated way and with appropriate regularity.  
(iv)   Known but unmitigated vulnerabilities are among the highest cybersecurity risks 
faced by executive departments and agencies (agencies). Known vulnerabilities include 
using operating systems or hardware beyond the vendor's support lifecycle, declining to 
implement a vendor's security patch, or failing to execute security-specific configuration 
guidance. 
(v)    Effective risk management requires agency heads to lead integrated teams of senior 
executives with expertise in IT, security, budgeting, acquisition, law, privacy, and human 
resources. 
(c)  Risk Management. 
(i)    Agency heads will be held accountable by the President for implementing risk 
management measures commensurate with the risk and magnitude of the harm that would 




of IT and data. They will also be held accountable by the President for ensuring that 
cybersecurity risk management processes are aligned with strategic, operational, and 
budgetary planning processes, in accordance with chapter 35, subchapter II of title 44, 
United States Code.  
(ii)   Effective immediately, each agency head shall use The Framework for Improving 
Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity (the Framework) developed by the National Institute 
of Standards and Technology, or any successor document, to manage the agency's 
cybersecurity risk. Each agency head shall provide a risk management report to the 
Secretary of Homeland Security and the Director of the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) within 90 days of the date of this order. The risk management report 
shall: 
(A)  document the risk mitigation and acceptance choices made by each agency head as 
of the date of this order, including: 
(1)  the strategic, operational, and budgetary considerations that informed those choices; 
and 
(2)  any accepted risk, including from unmitigated vulnerabilities; and 
(B)  describe the agency's action plan to implement the Framework. 
(iii)  The Secretary of Homeland Security and the Director of OMB, consistent with 
chapter 35, subchapter II of title 44, United States Code, shall jointly assess each agency's 
risk management report to determine whether the risk mitigation and acceptance choices 
set forth in the reports are appropriate and sufficient to manage the cybersecurity risk to 




(iv)   The Director of OMB, in coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security, 
with appropriate support from the Secretary of Commerce and the Administrator of 
General Services, and within 60 days of receipt of the agency risk management reports 
outlined in subsection (c)(ii) of this section, shall submit to the President, through the 
Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, the following: 
(A)  the determination; and 
(B)  a plan to: 
(1)  adequately protect the executive branch enterprise, should the determination identify 
insufficiencies; 
(2)  address immediate unmet budgetary needs necessary to manage risk to the executive 
branch enterprise; 
(3)  establish a regular process for reassessing and, if appropriate, reissuing the 
determination, and addressing future, recurring unmet budgetary needs necessary to 
manage risk to the executive branch enterprise;  
(4)  clarify, reconcile, and reissue, as necessary and to the extent permitted by law, all 
policies, standards, and guidelines issued by any agency in furtherance of chapter 35, 
subchapter II of title 44, United States Code, and, as necessary and to the extent permitted 
by law, issue policies, standards, and guidelines in furtherance of this order; and 
(5)  align these policies, standards, and guidelines with the Framework. 
(v)    The agency risk management reports described in subsection (c)(ii) of this section 
and the determination and plan described in subsections (c)(iii) and (iv) of this section 




(vi)   Effective immediately, it is the policy of the executive branch to build and maintain 
a modern, secure, and more resilient executive branch IT architecture.  
(A)  Agency heads shall show preference in their procurement for shared IT services, to 
the extent permitted by law, including email, cloud, and cybersecurity services.  
(B)  The Director of the American Technology Council shall coordinate a report to the 
President from the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director of OMB, and the 
Administrator of General Services, in consultation with the Secretary of Commerce, as 
appropriate, regarding modernization of Federal IT. The report shall: 
(1)  be completed within 90 days of the date of this order; and  
(2)  describe the legal, policy, and budgetary considerations relevant to -- as well as the 
technical feasibility and cost effectiveness, including timelines and milestones, of -- 
transitioning all agencies, or a subset of agencies, to: 
(aa)  one or more consolidated network architectures; and 
(bb)  shared IT services, including email, cloud, and cybersecurity services. 
(C)  The report described in subsection (c)(vi)(B) of this section shall assess the effects of 
transitioning all agencies, or a subset of agencies, to shared IT services with respect to 
cybersecurity, including by making recommendations to ensure consistency with section 
227 of the Homeland Security Act (6 U.S.C. 148) and compliance with policies and 
practices issued in accordance with section 3553 of title 44, United States Code. All 
agency heads shall supply such information concerning their current IT architectures and 




(vii)  For any National Security System, as defined in section 3552(b)(6) of title 44, 
United States Code, the Secretary of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence, 
rather than the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Director of OMB, shall 
implement this order to the maximum extent feasible and appropriate. The Secretary of 
Defense and the Director of National Intelligence shall provide a report to the Assistant to 
the President for National Security Affairs and the Assistant to the President for 
Homeland Security and Counterterrorism describing their implementation of subsection 
(c) of this section within 150 days of the date of this order. The report described in this 
subsection shall include a justification for any deviation from the requirements of 
subsection (c), and may be classified in full or in part, as appropriate.  
Sec. 2. Cybersecurity of Critical Infrastructure.  
(a)  Policy. It is the policy of the executive branch to use its authorities and capabilities to 
support the cybersecurity risk management efforts of the owners and operators of the 
Nation's critical infrastructure (as defined in section 5195c(e) of title 42, United States 
Code) (critical infrastructure entities), as appropriate. 
(b)  Support to Critical Infrastructure at Greatest Risk. The Secretary of Homeland 
Security, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the 
Director of National Intelligence, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the 
heads of appropriate sector-specific agencies, as defined in Presidential Policy Directive 
21 of February 12, 2013 (Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience) (sector-specific 
agencies), and all other appropriate agency heads, as identified by the Secretary of 




(i)    identify authorities and capabilities that agencies could employ to support the 
cybersecurity efforts of critical infrastructure entities identified pursuant to section 9 of 
Executive Order 13636 of February 12, 2013 (Improving Critical Infrastructure 
Cybersecurity), to be at greatest risk of attacks that could reasonably result in catastrophic 
regional or national effects on public health or safety, economic security, or national 
security (section 9 entities); 
(ii)   engage section 9 entities and solicit input as appropriate to evaluate whether and 
how the authorities and capabilities identified pursuant to subsection (b)(i) of this section 
might be employed to support cybersecurity risk management efforts and any obstacles to 
doing so;  
(iii)  provide a report to the President, which may be classified in full or in part, as 
appropriate, through the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and 
Counterterrorism, within 180 days of the date of this order, that includes the following: 
(A)  the authorities and capabilities identified pursuant to subsection (b)(i) of this section; 
(B)  the results of the engagement and determination required pursuant to subsection 
(b)(ii) of this section; and 
(C)  findings and recommendations for better supporting the cybersecurity risk 
management efforts of section 9 entities; and 
(iv)   provide an updated report to the President on an annual basis thereafter. 
(c)  Supporting Transparency in the Marketplace. The Secretary of Homeland Security, in 
coordination with the Secretary of Commerce, shall provide a report to the President, 




examines the sufficiency of existing Federal policies and practices to promote appropriate 
market transparency of cybersecurity risk management practices by critical infrastructure 
entities, with a focus on publicly traded critical infrastructure entities, within 90 days of 
the date of this order. 
(d)  Resilience Against Botnets and Other Automated, Distributed Threats. The Secretary 
of Commerce and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall jointly lead an open and 
transparent process to identify and promote action by appropriate stakeholders to improve 
the resilience of the internet and communications ecosystem and to encourage 
collaboration with the goal of dramatically reducing threats perpetrated by automated and 
distributed attacks (e.g., botnets). The Secretary of Commerce and the Secretary of 
Homeland Security shall consult with the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the 
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the heads of sector-specific agencies, the 
Chairs of the Federal Communications Commission and Federal Trade Commission, 
other interested agency heads, and appropriate stakeholders in carrying out this 
subsection. Within 240 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of Commerce and the 
Secretary of Homeland Security shall make publicly available a preliminary report on this 
effort. Within 1 year of the date of this order, the Secretaries shall submit a final version 
of this report to the President.  
(e)  Assessment of Electricity Disruption Incident Response Capabilities. The Secretary 
of Energy and the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Director of 
National Intelligence, with State, local, tribal, and territorial governments, and with 




(i)    the potential scope and duration of a prolonged power outage associated with a 
significant cyber incident, as defined in Presidential Policy Directive 41 of July 26, 2016 
(United States Cyber Incident Coordination), against the United States electric subsector; 
(ii)   the readiness of the United States to manage the consequences of such an incident; 
and 
(iii)  any gaps or shortcomings in assets or capabilities required to mitigate the 
consequences of such an incident.  
The assessment shall be provided to the President, through the Assistant to the President 
for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, within 90 days of the date of this order, and 
may be classified in full or in part, as appropriate.  
(f)  Department of Defense Warfighting Capabilities and Industrial Base. Within 90 days 
of the date of this order, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Homeland Security, 
and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, in coordination with the Director 
of National Intelligence, shall provide a report to the President, through the Assistant to 
the President for National Security Affairs and the Assistant to the President for 
Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, on cybersecurity risks facing the defense 
industrial base, including its supply chain, and United States military platforms, systems, 
networks, and capabilities, and recommendations for mitigating these risks. The report 
may be classified in full or in part, as appropriate. 
Sec. 3. Cybersecurity for the Nation. 
(a)  Policy. To ensure that the internet remains valuable for future generations, it is the 




internet that fosters efficiency, innovation, communication, and economic prosperity, 
while respecting privacy and guarding against disruption, fraud, and theft. Further, the 
United States seeks to support the growth and sustainment of a workforce that is skilled 
in cybersecurity and related fields as the foundation for achieving our objectives in 
cyberspace.  
(b)  Deterrence and Protection. Within 90 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of 
State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the 
Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the United States Trade 
Representative, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, shall jointly 
submit a report to the President, through the Assistant to the President for National 
Security Affairs and the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and 
Counterterrorism, on the Nation's strategic options for deterring adversaries and better 
protecting the American people from cyber threats. 
(c)  International Cooperation. As a highly connected nation, the United States is 
especially dependent on a globally secure and resilient internet and must work with allies 
and other partners toward maintaining the policy set forth in this section. Within 45 days 
of the date of this order, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the 
Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Commerce, and the Secretary of Homeland 
Security, in coordination with the Attorney General and the Director of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, shall submit reports to the President on their international 
cybersecurity priorities, including those concerning investigation, attribution, cyber threat 




submission of the reports, and in coordination with the agency heads listed in this 
subsection, and any other agency heads as appropriate, the Secretary of State shall 
provide a report to the President, through the Assistant to the President for Homeland 
Security and Counterterrorism, documenting an engagement strategy for international 
cooperation in cybersecurity. 
(d)  Workforce Development. In order to ensure that the United States maintains a long-
term cybersecurity advantage: 
(i)    The Secretary of Commerce and the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation 
with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Labor, the Secretary of Education, the 
Director of the Office of Personnel Management, and other agencies identified jointly by 
the Secretary of Commerce and the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall: 
(A)  jointly assess the scope and sufficiency of efforts to educate and train the American 
cybersecurity workforce of the future, including cybersecurity-related education 
curricula, training, and apprenticeship programs, from primary through higher education; 
and 
(B)  within 120 days of the date of this order, provide a report to the President, through 
the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, with findings 
and recommendations regarding how to support the growth and sustainment of the 
Nation's cybersecurity workforce in both the public and private sectors. 
(ii)   The Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the heads of other 




(A)  review the workforce development efforts of potential foreign cyber peers in order to 
help identify foreign workforce development practices likely to affect long-term United 
States cybersecurity competitiveness; and  
(B)  within 60 days of the date of this order, provide a report to the President through the 
Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism on the findings of 
the review carried out pursuant to subsection (d)(ii)(A) of this section. 
(iii)  The Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of Commerce, the 
Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director of National Intelligence, shall: 
(A)  assess the scope and sufficiency of United States efforts to ensure that the United 
States maintains or increases its advantage in national-security-related cyber capabilities; 
and 
(B)  within 150 days of the date of this order, provide a report to the President, through 
the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, with findings 
and recommendations on the assessment carried out pursuant to subsection (d)(iii)(A) of 
this section. 
(iv)   The reports described in this subsection may be classified in full or in part, as 
appropriate. 
Sec. 4. Definitions. For the purposes of this order: 
(a)  The term "appropriate stakeholders" means any non-executive-branch person or 
entity that elects to participate in an open and transparent process established by the 





(b)  The term "information technology" (IT) has the meaning given to that term in section 
11101(6) of title 40, United States Code, and further includes hardware and software 
systems of agencies that monitor and control physical equipment and processes. 
(c)  The term "IT architecture" refers to the integration and implementation of IT within 
an agency. 
(d)  The term "network architecture" refers to the elements of IT architecture that enable 
or facilitate communications between two or more IT assets. 
Sec. 5. General Provisions. (a)  Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or 
otherwise affect: 
(i)   the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head 
thereof; or 
(ii)  the functions of the Director of OMB relating to budgetary, administrative, or 
legislative proposals. 
(b)  This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the 
availability of appropriations. 
(c)  All actions taken pursuant to this order shall be consistent with requirements and 
authorities to protect intelligence and law enforcement sources and methods. Nothing in 
this order shall be construed to supersede measures established under authority of law to 
protect the security and integrity of specific activities and associations that are in direct 




(d)  This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or 
procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its 
departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person. 
 
DONALD J. TRUMP 
THE WHITE HOUSE, 





Appendix E: Proposed Amended Language to the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 
Proposed language changes are underlined.  
(a)Whoever—  
(1)having knowingly accessed a computer without authorization or exceeding authorized 
access, and by means of such conduct having obtained information that has been 
determined by the United States Government pursuant to an Executive order or statute to 
require protection against unauthorized disclosure for reasons of national sustainability,  
national defense, or foreign relations, or any restricted data, as defined in paragraph y. of 
section 11 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, with reason to believe that such 
information so obtained could be used to the injury of the United States, or to the 
advantage of any foreign nation willfully communicates, delivers, transmits, or causes to 
be communicated, delivered, or transmitted, or attempts to communicate, deliver, 
transmit or cause to be communicated, delivered, or transmitted the same to any person 
not entitled to receive it, or willfully retains the same and fails to deliver it to the officer 
or employee of the United States entitled to receive it;  
(2) intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access, 
and thereby obtains—  
(A) information contained in a financial record of a financial institution, or of a card 
issuer as defined in section 1602(n) [1] of title 15, or contained in a file of a consumer 
reporting agency on a consumer, as such terms are defined in the Fair Credit Reporting 
Act (15 U.S.C. 1681 et seq.);  




(C) information from any private or non-government organization responsible for owning 
and or operating systems critical to the sustainability of the United States as defined as 
Critical Infrastructure; or 
(C) information from any protected computer;  
(3) intentionally, without authorization to access any nonpublic computer of a department 
or agency of the United States, accesses such a computer of that department or agency 
that is exclusively for the use of the Government of the United States or, in the case of a 
computer not exclusively for such use, is used by or for the Government of the United 
States and such conduct affects that use by or for the Government of the United States;  
(4) knowingly and with intent to defraud, accesses a protected computer without 
authorization, or exceeds authorized access, and by means of such conduct furthers the 
intended fraud and obtains anything of value, unless the object of the fraud and the thing 
obtained consists only of the use of the computer and the value of such use is not more 
than $5,000 in any 1-year period;  
(5) 
(A) knowingly causes the transmission of a program, information, code, or command, 
and as a result of such conduct, intentionally causes damage without authorization, to a 
protected computer;  
(B)intentionally accesses a protected computer without authorization, and as a result of 
such conduct, recklessly causes damage; or  
(C)intentionally accesses a protected computer without authorization, and as a result of 




(6) knowingly and with intent to defraud traffics (as defined in section 1029) in any 
password or similar information through which a computer may be accessed without 
authorization, if—  
(A)such trafficking affects interstate or foreign commerce; or  
(B )such computer is used by or for the Government of the United States; [3]  
(7) with intent to extort from any person any money or other thing of value, transmits in 
interstate or foreign commerce any communication containing any—  
(A) threat to cause damage to a protected computer;  
(B) threat to obtain information from a protected computer without authorization or in 
excess of authorization or to impair the confidentiality of information obtained from a 
protected computer without authorization or by exceeding authorized access; or  
(C) demand or request for money or other thing of value in relation to damage to a 
protected computer, where such damage was caused to facilitate the extortion;  
shall be punished as provided in subsection (c) of this section. 
(b)Whoever conspires to commit or attempts to commit an offense under subsection (a) 
of this section shall be punished as provided in subsection (c) of this section.  
(c) The punishment for an offense under subsection (a) or (b) of this section is—  
(1) 
(A) a fine under this title or imprisonment for not more than ten years, or both, in the case 
of an offense under subsection (a)(1) of this section which does not occur after a 
conviction for another offense under this section, or an attempt to commit an offense 




(B) a fine under this title or imprisonment for not more than twenty years, or both, in the 
case of an offense under subsection (a)(1) of this section which occurs after a conviction 
for another offense under this section, or an attempt to commit an offense punishable 
under this subparagraph;  
(2) 
(A) except as provided in subparagraph (B), a fine under this title or imprisonment for not 
more than one year, or both, in the case of an offense under subsection (a)(2), (a)(3), or 
(a)(6) of this section which does not occur after a conviction for another offense under 
this section, or an attempt to commit an offense punishable under this subparagraph;  
(B)a fine under this title or imprisonment for not more than 5 years, or both, in the case of 
an offense under subsection (a)(2), or an attempt to commit an offense punishable under 
this subparagraph, if—  
(i) the offense was committed for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial 
gain;  
(ii) the offense was committed in furtherance of any criminal or tortious act in violation 
of the Constitution or laws of the United States or of any State; or  
(iii) the value of the information obtained exceeds $5,000; and  
(C) a fine under this title or imprisonment for not more than ten years, or both, in the case 
of an offense under subsection (a)(2), (a)(3) or (a)(6) of this section which occurs after a 
conviction for another offense under this section, or an attempt to commit an offense 





(A)a fine under this title or imprisonment for not more than five years, or both, in the 
case of an offense under subsection (a)(4) or (a)(7) of this section which does not occur 
after a conviction for another offense under this section, or an attempt to commit an 
offense punishable under this subparagraph; and  
(B)a fine under this title or imprisonment for not more than ten years, or both, in the case 
of an offense under subsection (a)(4),[4] or (a)(7) of this section which occurs after a 
conviction for another offense under this section, or an attempt to commit an offense 
punishable under this subparagraph;  
(4) 
(A)except as provided in subparagraphs (E) and (F), a fine under this title, imprisonment 
for not more than 5 years, or both, in the case of—  
(i)an offense under subsection (a)(5)(B), which does not occur after a conviction for 
another offense under this section, if the offense caused (or, in the case of an attempted 
offense, would, if completed, have caused)—  
(I)loss to 1 or more persons during any 1-year period (and, for purposes of an 
investigation, prosecution, or other proceeding brought by the United States only, loss 
resulting from a related course of conduct affecting 1 or more critical infrastructure 
computers or other protected computers) aggregating at least $5,000 in value;  
(II)the modification or impairment, or potential modification or impairment, of the 
medical examination, diagnosis, treatment, or care of 1 or more individuals;  
(III)physical injury to any person;  




(V)damage affecting a computer used by or for an entity of the United States Government 
in furtherance of the administration of justice, national sustainability, national defense, or 
national security; or  
(VI)damage affecting 10 or more computers used to operate critical infrastructure or 
protected computers during any 1-year period; or  
(ii)an attempt to commit an offense punishable under this subparagraph;  
(B)except as provided in subparagraphs (E) and (F), a fine under this title, imprisonment 
for not more than 10 years, or both, in the case of—  
(i)an offense under subsection (a)(5)(A), which does not occur after a conviction for 
another offense under this section, if the offense caused (or, in the case of an attempted 
offense, would, if completed, have caused) a harm provided in subclauses (I) through 
(VI) of subparagraph (A)(i); or  
(ii)an attempt to commit an offense punishable under this subparagraph;  
(C)except as provided in subparagraphs (E) and (F), a fine under this title, imprisonment 
for not more than 20 years, or both, in the case of—  
(i)an offense or an attempt to commit an offense under subparagraphs (A) or (B) of 
subsection (a)(5) that occurs after a conviction for another offense under this section; or  
(ii)an attempt to commit an offense punishable under this subparagraph;  
(D)a fine under this title, imprisonment for not more than 10 years, or both, in the case 
of—  
(i)an offense or an attempt to commit an offense under subsection (a)(5)(C) that occurs 




(ii)an attempt to commit an offense punishable under this subparagraph;  
(E)if the offender attempts to cause or knowingly or recklessly causes serious bodily 
injury from conduct in violation of subsection (a)(5)(A), a fine under this title, 
imprisonment for not more than 20 years, or both;  
(F)if the offender attempts to cause or knowingly or recklessly causes death from conduct 
in violation of subsection (a)(5)(A), a fine under this title, imprisonment for any term of 
years or for life, or both; or  
(G)a fine under this title, imprisonment for not more than 1 year, or both, for—  
(i)any other offense under subsection (a)(5); or  
(ii)an attempt to commit an offense punishable under this subparagraph.  
(d) 
(1) The United States Secret Service shall, in addition to any other agency having such 
authority, have the authority to investigate offenses under this section.  
(2)The Federal Bureau of Investigation shall have primary authority to investigate 
offenses under subsection (a)(1) for any cases involving espionage, foreign 
counterintelligence, information protected against unauthorized disclosure for reasons of 
national sustainability, national defense or foreign relations, or Restricted Data (as that 
term is defined in section 11y of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2014(y)), 
except for offenses affecting the duties of the United States Secret Service pursuant to 
section 3056(a) of this title.  
(3) Such authority shall be exercised in accordance with an agreement which shall be 




(e)As used in this section—  
(1) the term “computer” means an electronic, magnetic, optical, electrochemical, or other 
high speed data processing device performing logical, arithmetic, or storage functions, 
and includes any data storage facility or communications facility directly related to or 
operating in conjunction with such device, but such term does not include an automated 
typewriter or typesetter, a portable hand held calculator, or other similar device;  
(2)the term “protected computer” means a computer—  
(A)exclusively for the use of a financial institution or the United States Government, or, 
in the case of a computer not exclusively for such use, used by or for a financial 
institution or the United States Government and the conduct constituting the offense 
affects that use by or for the financial institution or the Government; or  
(B)which is used in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or communication, 
including a computer located outside the United States that is used in a manner that 
affects interstate or foreign commerce or communication of the United States;  
(3)the term “State” includes the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 
and any other commonwealth, possession or territory of the United States;  
(4)the term “financial institution” means—  
(A)an institution, with deposits insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation;  
(B)the Federal Reserve or a member of the Federal Reserve including any Federal 
Reserve Bank;  
(C)a credit union with accounts insured by the National Credit Union Administration;  




(E)any institution of the Farm Credit System under the Farm Credit Act of 1971;  
(F)a broker-dealer registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission pursuant to 
section 15 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;  
(G)the Securities Investor Protection Corporation;  
(H)a branch or agency of a foreign bank (as such terms are defined in paragraphs (1) and 
(3) of section 1(b) of the International Banking Act of 1978); and  
(I)an organization operating under section 25 or section 25(a) 1 of the Federal Reserve 
Act;  
(5)the term “financial record” means information derived from any record held by a 
financial institution pertaining to a customer’s relationship with the financial institution;  
(6)the term “exceeds authorized access” means to access a computer with authorization 
and to use such access to obtain or alter information in the computer that the accesser is 
not entitled so to obtain or alter;  
(7)the term “department of the United States” means the legislative or judicial branch of 
the Government or one of the executive departments enumerated in section 101 of title 5;  
(8)the term “damage” means any impairment to the integrity or availability of data, a 
program, a system, or information;  
(9)the term “government entity” includes the Government of the United States, any State 
or political subdivision of the United States, any foreign country, and any state, province, 




(10)the term “conviction” shall include a conviction under the law of any State for a 
crime punishable by imprisonment for more than 1 year, an element of which is 
unauthorized access, or exceeding authorized access, to a computer;  
(11)the term “loss” means any reasonable cost to any victim, including the cost of 
responding to an offense, conducting a damage assessment, and restoring the data, 
program, system, or information to its condition prior to the offense, and any revenue 
lost, cost incurred, or other consequential damages incurred because of interruption of 
service;  
(12) the term “Critical Infrastructure” means essential services that underpin American 
Society owned and operated by the United States government, private sector, and non-
government organizations to strengthen and maintain secure, functioning, and resilient 
assets, networks, and systems vital to the Nation’s safety, prosperity, and well-being as 
defined in Presidential Policy Directive 21, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7, 
and Homeland Security Critical Infrastructure Sectors.  
(13) the term “person” means any individual, firm, corporation, educational institution, 
financial institution, governmental entity, or legal or other entity.  
(f)This section does not prohibit any lawfully authorized investigative, protective, or 
intelligence activity of a law enforcement agency of the United States, a State, or a 
political subdivision of a State, or of an intelligence agency of the United States.  
(g)Any person who suffers damage or loss by reason of a violation of this section may 
maintain a civil action against the violator to obtain compensatory damages and 




be brought only if the conduct involves 1 of the factors set forth in subclauses [5] (I), (II), 
(III), (IV), or (V) of subsection (c)(4)(A)(i). Damages for a violation involving only 
conduct described in subsection (c)(4)(A)(i)(I) are limited to economic damages. No 
action may be brought under this subsection unless such action is begun within 2 years of 
the date of the act complained of or the date of the discovery of the damage. No action 
may be brought under this subsection for the negligent design or manufacture of 
computer hardware, computer software, or firmware.  
(h)The Attorney General and the Secretary of the Treasury shall report to the Congress 
annually, during the first 3 years following the date of the enactment of this subsection, 
concerning investigations and prosecutions under subsection (a)(5).  
(i) 
(1) The court, in imposing sentence on any person convicted of a violation of this section, 
or convicted of conspiracy to violate this section, shall order, in addition to any other 
sentence imposed and irrespective of any provision of State law, that such person forfeit 
to the United States—  
(A)such person’s interest in any personal property that was used or intended to be used to 
commit or to facilitate the commission of such violation; and  
(B)any property, real or personal, constituting or derived from, any proceeds that such 
person obtained, directly or indirectly, as a result of such violation.  
(2)The criminal forfeiture of property under this subsection, any seizure and disposition 




provisions of section 413 of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act 
of 1970 (21 U.S.C. 853), except subsection (d) of that section.  
(j)For purposes of subsection (i), the following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United 
States and no property right shall exist in them:  
(1)Any personal property used or intended to be used to commit or to facilitate the 
commission of any violation of this section, or a conspiracy to violate this section.  
(2)Any property, real or personal, which constitutes or is derived from proceeds traceable 
to any violation of this section, or a conspiracy to violate this section [6] 
